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ASEAN INVESTMENT TREATIES, RCEP, AND CPTPP: 
REGIONAL STRATEGIES, NORMS, INSTITUTIONS, AND 
POLITICS 
 
Diane A. Desierto† 
 
Abstract:  Southeast Asia attracts foreign investment more rapidly than elsewhere 
in the world, including China.  Southeast Asia’s evolving regional strategies, norms, 
institutions, and politics for investment governance should be of considerable interest to 
global decision-makers.  This Article compares evolving investment treaty strategies and 
norms between the regional investment treaties of: (1) the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (“ASEAN”); (2) the latest draft investment chapter of the China-led sixteen-
member Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (“RCEP”), to which all ten 
ASEAN Member States are also negotiating parties; and (3) some features of the current 
draft investment chapter for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (now renamed the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (“CPTPP”)). 
 
Cite as:  Diane A. Desierto, ASEAN Investment Treaties, RCEP, and CPTPP: Regional 
Strategies, Norms, Institutions, and Politics, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 349 (2018). 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The importance of the regional dimension in economic diplomacy has 
fluctuated over time because of doubts about the effectiveness of the 
multilateral system. 1   Regional economic agreements, although often 
                                                          
† Associate Professor (tenured) of Human Rights Law and Global Affairs, Keough School of Global 
Affairs with concurrent appointment at the Law School, University of Notre Dame; Professor of International 
Law and Human Rights, Philippine Judicial Academy of the Supreme Court of the Philippines; Adjunct 
Fellow, WSD Handa Center for Human Rights and International Justice, Stanford University.  All views and 
errors mine.  I can be reached at dianedesierto@aya.yale.edu. With thanks to Dr. Tim Buehrer at the ASEAN 
Connectivity through Trade and Investment, and counsels at the ASEAN Legal Affairs Division for various 
discussions, as well as to Professor Susan Franck, President of the Academic Council of the Institute of 
Transnational Arbitration, for our previous discussions on treaty monitoring and oversight mechanisms. 
1 For ease of reference, recurring acronyms used in footnotes and the body text of this Article will be 
listed here in alphabetical order: Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”); ASEAN 
Comprehensive Investment Agreement (“ACIA”); ASEAN Economic Community (“AEC”); ASEAN 
Investment Area (“AIA”); bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”); Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam 
(“CMLV”); Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (“CPTPP”); 
Coordinating Committee on Investment (“CCI”); European Union (“EU”); fair and equitable treatment 
(“FET”); foreign direct investment (“FDI”); free trade agreement (“FTA”); full protection and security 
(“FPS”); General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”); International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (“ICSID”); international investment agreement (“IIA”); International Monetary Fund 
(“IMF”); merger and acquisition (“M&A”); micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprise (“MSME”); most 
favored nation (“MFN”); multinational enterprise (“MNE”); Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(“RCEP”); special and differential treatment (“SDT”); trade and investment framework agreement (“TIFA”); 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”); United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”); World Trade Organization (“WTO”). 
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politically motivated, offer a more rapid way of opening markets.  
Liberalization may be easier for national interests to accept when it occurs 
within a regional group of countries with broadly the same levels of 
development and similar policy preferences.2  Regional economic integration 
necessitates policy and regulatory changes and refinements in most, if not all, 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) Member States, taking 
into consideration their different levels of development.3 
 
Under the unique horizontally embedded economic integration model 
in the ASEAN Charter and ASEAN Economic Community (“AEC”) 
Blueprint, Southeast Asia is poised to escalate its regional investment rule-
making and institutional architecture.  This is particularly so with its massive 
cross-border projects targeted under the ASEAN Master Plan on Connectivity 
2025, as well as with flagship investment projects with key ASEAN regional 
partners: China (through the One Belt, One Road program), Japan (in relation 
to its Quality Infrastructure program), South Korea, the European Union, 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States. 
 
Part II describes the current state of Southeast Asia’s burgeoning sources 
of foreign investment growth in the past decade and the targets for regional 
foreign investment expansion under the AEC Blueprint and Master Plan on 
Connectivity.  Part III examines ASEAN’s regional investment treaties to 
date—scrutinizing various common features to establish both ASEAN’s 
preferences for investment openness and retention of regulatory space for 
host-states to foreign investment.  These common features of regional 
commitments are then examined alongside Southeast Asia’s other 
contemplated regional commitments in the draft investment chapters of the 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (“RCEP”) and the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(“CPTPP”), particularly in the substantive areas of scope of investment, 
investment protection standards, public policy provisions to defend host-state 
regulatory policies, transparency requirements and treaty monitoring policies, 
and investor-state dispute settlement options.  Noting divergences in the 
quality of Southeast Asia’s regional commitments throughout these regimes, 
Part IV anticipates the likely sites for dispute.  These sites for dispute are 
                                                          
2 Nicholas Bayne & Stephen Woolcock, What is Economic Diplomacy?, in THE NEW ECONOMIC 
DIPLOMACY: DECISION-MAKING AND NEGOTIATION IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1, 8–9 
(Nicholas Bayne & Stephen Woolcock eds., 3d ed. 2011). 
3 ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025, ¶ 38 (Nov. 22, 2015), 
http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2015/November/aec-page/AEC-Blueprint-2025-FINAL.pdf 
[hereinafter AEC Blueprint 2025]. 
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largely due to the disparate approaches to investment monitoring, treaty-
making, and investment governance among countries in Southeast Asia.  The 
Conclusion suggests recommendations for legal harmonization and 
institutional coordination. 
 
II. SOUTHEAST ASIA INVESTMENT TRENDS AND TARGETS UNDER THE AEC 
 
In recent years, Southeast Asia has experienced a rapid expansion in 
foreign direct investment (“FDI”), with the region hailed as attracting “more 
foreign direct investment combined than China.”4  Individual Member States 
of ASEAN, such as Indonesia,5 Singapore,6 the Philippines,7 and Vietnam,8 
are touted as among the world’s fastest-growing economies for FDI.  The 
ASEAN Investment Report 2017, prepared by the ASEAN Secretariat and the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”), found 
that despite the global economic situation resulting in the overall FDI flows 
in ASEAN falling twenty percent to $96.7 billion in 2016, “there were some 
bright spots.  Flows from most of ASEAN’s major Dialogue Partner countries 
and intra-ASEAN investment rose.”9  The report reasoned that “[t]he decline 
                                                          
4 Nicholas Owen, Southeast Asia Attracts More Foreign Direct Investment than China for Second 
Year in a Row, REUTERS (Mar. 16, 2015, 12:15 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/southeast-asia-
investment/southeast-asia-attracts-more-foreign-direct-investment-than-china-for-second-year-idUSL4N0 
WE1Q620150316. 
5 See, e.g., Karlis Salna & Haslinda Amin, Jokowi Says His Reforms are a Success with Growth Above 
5%, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 5, 2017, 7:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-06/jokowi-
says-his-reforms-are-a-success-with-growth-back-above-5. 
6 See, e.g., Chuang Peck Ming, Singapore Remains a Top FDI Destination Globally, BUS. TIMES 
(Feb. 14, 2017, 5:50 AM), http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/singapore-remains-a-
top-fdi-destination-globally. 
7 See, e.g., Karl Lester M. Yap, Rising Tiger Philippines Posts Some of the World’s Fastest Growth, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 25, 2017, 6:28 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-26/asia-s-new-
growth-leader-takes-over-from-fading-tiger-economies; Panos Mourdoukoutas, Duterte’s Philippines 
Economy Beats China’s, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2017, 2:53 PM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/panos 
mourdoukoutas/2017/12/09/dutertes-philippines-economy-beats-chinas/; Panos Mourdoukoutas, Duterte’s 
Philippines is the 10th Fastest Growing Economy in the World, FORBES (June 20, 2017, 9:21 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2017/06/20/dutertes-philippines-is-the-10th-fastest-
growing-economy-in-the-world/; The Philippines Records Highest Foreign Investment Growth in ASEAN, 
OXFORD BUS. GROUP (Nov. 22, 2017), https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/news/philippines-records-highest-
foreign-investment-growth-asean. 
8 See, e.g., Nguyen Dieu Tu Uyen, Vietnam Forecasts Record Foreign Investment of $16 Billion, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 3, 2017, 9:21 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-04/vietnam-
forecasts-record-foreign-investment-of-over-16-billion. 
9 ASEAN SECRETARIAT & UNCTAD, ASEAN INVESTMENT REPORT 2017: FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC ZONES IN ASEAN 43 (2017), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ 
unctad_asean_air2017d1.pdf [hereinafter ASEAN INVESTMENT REPORT 2017]; see also ASEAN 
SECRETARIAT & UNCTAD, ASEAN INVESTMENT REPORT 2016: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND MSME 
LINKAGES, at xv (2016), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/unctad_asean_air2016d1.pdf [hereinafter 
ASEAN INVESTMENT REPORT 2016]. 
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in 2016 was due to one-off factors,” whereas “[t]he growth of intra-ASEAN 
investment derived in part from a spate of greenfield investments and 
intraregional [merger and acquisition] activities.” 10   Factors such as 
establishment of the AEC and growing regional opportunities both 
“contributed to the rise of intra-ASEAN investment, which for the first time 
accounted for a quarter of total FDI in the region.”11  The report concluded 
that: 
 
Despite the atypical 2016 FDI performance, the region continued 
to attract a high level of FDI, reflecting ASEAN’s resilience and 
the region’s attractiveness and competitiveness in attracting 
investment.  Twenty years on from the 1997–1998 Asian 
financial crisis, FDI flows in ASEAN have rebounded 
significantly to levels surpassing the precrisis peak by more than 
2.8 times.  The region will continue to attract strong FDI flows 
with greater regional value chain and supply chain activities in 
the years ahead.12 
 
Southeast Asia’s approach to investment policy and investment governance 
has gained significance since the launch of the AEC at the end of 2015,13 
spanning a market estimated at $2.6 trillion in value with a combined 
population of over 622 million people. 14   Southeast Asia’s approach to 
investment policy and governance is depicted as: (1) highly pluralist 
(especially regarding investment sources and forms of investment); (2) largely 
decentralized with ASEAN investment facilitated through “coordination” by 
the AEC institutions with the ASEAN Member State governments; and (3) 
relatively passive (at least compared to other regions such as Europe) when it 
comes to long-term standardization of investment protection standards, host-
state public policy provisions, and investor-state dispute settlement reform.  
In an era where so much of the world is caught up on global reforms to the 
investment law system,15 ASEAN focuses its efforts on regional investment 
                                                          
10 ASEAN INVESTMENT REPORT 2017, supra note 9, at 43. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 See ASEAN Economic Bloc Launched, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER (Jan. 1, 2016, 2:09 AM), 
http://globalnation.inquirer.net/134407/asean-economic-bloc-launched. 
14 ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN, http://asean.org/asean-economic-community/ (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2018). 
15 See Press Release, UNCITRAL Secretariat, UNCITRAL to Consider Possible Reform of Investor-
State Dispute Settlement, U.N. Press Release UNIS/L/250 (July 14, 2017), http://www.unis.unvienna.org/ 
unis/en/pressrels/2017/unisl250.html. 
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promotion incentives16 while leaving investment protection to the individual 
initiatives of the respective governments of ASEAN Member States.17  As of 
this writing, ASEAN has not yet built any long-term regional governance 
infrastructure to address cross-border problems that may arise from such a 
rapid expansion of FDI across and within Southeast Asian borders.18 
 
The unique state of ASEAN investment policy-making should also be 
considered in the context of Southeast Asia’s ambitious targets for short- and 
long-term regional investment.  The AEC Blueprint 2025 sets forth the 
following policy targets for ASEAN’s investment environment: 
 
ASEAN aims to enhance further its attractiveness as an 
investment destination globally through the establishment of an 
open, transparent, and predictable investment regime in the 
region.  The improvement in the investment environment in 
ASEAN is being achieved through the implementation of the 
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA), which 
(i) provides for progressive liberalisation of existing investment 
restrictions in manufacturing, agriculture, fishery, forestry, and 
mining and the services incidental to these sectors; (ii) 
significantly strengthens investment protection; and (iii) ensures 
transparency of investment laws, regulations, and administrative 
guidelines.19 
 
                                                          
16 See Mayvelin U. Carballo, BMI Sees ASEAN Growth Sustained, MANILA TIMES (Nov. 27, 2017), 
http://www.manilatimes.net/bmi-sees-asean-growth-sustained/365216/. 
17 See Diane A. Desierto, Regulatory Freedom and Control in the New ASEAN Regional Investment 
Treaties, 16 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 1018 (2015); see generally PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, SOUTHEAST 
ASIA INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES: TAX & OTHER INCENTIVES (Greg Lamont ed., 2012), 
https://www.pwc.com/th/en/publications/download/south-east-asia-web.pdf. 
18 See generally Anja Kaspersen, 7 Sources of Geo-Economic Risk in East Asia, WORLD ECON. F. 
(May 12, 2015), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/05/7-sources-of-geo-economic-risk-in-east-asia/; 
Alexander C. Chandra & Fina Astriana, Environmental Protection in the Post-2015 ASEAN Economic 
Community, HEINRICH BÖLL STIFTUNG (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.boell.de/en/2015/10/28/umweltschutz-
der-asean-wirtschaftsgemeinschaft-nach-2015; Wee Ee Cheong, Deepening Connectivity Within ASEAN, 
BANGKOK POST (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.bangkokpost.com/business/news/1372007/deepening-
connectivity-within-asean; Amelia U. Santos-Paulino, The Asian Economic Integration Cooperation 
Agreement: Lessons for Economic and Social Development 11–13, UNCTAD/SER.RP/2017/3 (UNCTAD, 
Research Paper No. 3, 2017), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ser-rp-2017d3_en.pdf. 
19 AEC Blueprint 2025, supra note 3, ¶ 14. 
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Strategic measures for attaining this investment environment identified within 
the AEC Blueprint 2025 range from eliminating “investment restrictions and 
impediments” to promoting “ASEAN as an investment destination.”20 
 
This Article examines the nature of ASEAN’s regional commitments 
towards investment protection and host-state public policy protection, along 
with its emerging investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms within the 
broader framework of dispute settlement in the AEC.  It seeks to identify 
commonalities and differences in the quality of ASEAN’s regional obligations 
in its six current regional investment treaties (both intra-ASEAN21 and with 
the following countries: Australia and New Zealand, 22  China, 23  South 
Korea,24 India,25 and Hong Kong26) alongside its draft investment chapters in 
the larger mega-regional agreements, such as the RCEP27 the CPTPP.28  It 
                                                          
20 Id. ¶ 15. 
21 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, Feb. 26, 2009, ASEAN Legal Instruments No. 30 
(entered into force Feb. 24, 2012), http://agreement.asean.org/media/download/20140119035519.pdf 
[hereinafter ACIA]. 
22 Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area ch. 11, Feb. 27, 2009, 
2672 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 1, 2010), http://asean.org/storage/2012/05/AANZFTA-legal-text-
PRINTED-Signed.pdf [hereinafter ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter]. 
23 Agreement on Investment of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Between the People’s Republic of China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Aug. 15, 2009 
(entered into force Jan. 1 2010), http://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/archive/ 
22974.pdf [hereinafter ASEAN-China Investment Agreement]. 
24 Agreement on Investment Under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Among the Governments of the Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations and the Republic of Korea, June 2, 2009 (entered into force Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.asean.org/ 
storage/images/archive/22973.pdf [hereinafter ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement]. 
25 Agreement on Investment Under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Republic of India, Nov. 12, 2014, 
http://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ASEAN-India-Investment-Agreement-ASEAN-
version.pdf [hereinafter ASEAN-India Investment Agreement]. 
26 Agreement on Investment Among the Governments of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region of the People’s Republic of China and the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, Nov. 12, 2017, https://www.tid.gov.hk/english/ita/fta/hkasean/files/IPPAASEAN.pdf [hereinafter 
ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement]. 
27 Treaty Draft, RCEP Working Grp. in Inv., RCEP Draft Investment Text (Oct. 16, 2015), 
https://rceplegal.files.wordpress.com/2016/08/03-rcep-wgi10-draftconsolidated-investmenttext.pdf 
[hereinafter RCEP Draft Investment Chapter]; see also Treaty Draft, RCEP Working Grp. in Inv., RCEP 
Draft Chapter on Investment: Temporary Safeguard Measures (Dec. 6–10, 2016), 
https://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/rcep-invesment-temporarysafeguardmeasures.pdf. 
28 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans Pacific Partnership ch. 9, expected to open 
for signature Mar. 8, 2018, https://mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trans-Pacific-Partnership/Text/9.-Investment-
Chapter.pdf [hereinafter CPTPP Draft Investment Chapter]. Although, note must be taken of the key elements 
of the CPTPP and the draft provisions of the TPP on investor-state dispute settlement that are to be suspended. 
See Donald Robertson et al., A Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS LLP (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/ 
latest-thinking/a-comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership; see also Press 
April 2018 ASEAN Investment Treaties 
 
355 
considers the dearth of regional investment governance institutions in 
ASEAN, which may affect the harmonization of differing regional standards 
of investment protection and public policy innovation for Southeast Asia, and 
situates the current mechanisms for investor-state dispute settlement within 
the framework of dispute settlement under the AEC and the ASEAN Charter.  
These differences, should they remain unaddressed in the ASEAN regional 
governance institutions, will likely be detrimental to the achievement of 
ASEAN objectives for expanding Southeast Asia’s attractiveness as a global 
investment destination. 
 
Preliminarily, one should note that not all ASEAN Member States 
enjoy the same level of FDI growth29—among the ten ASEAN Member 
States, it has been variably favorable between the more established ASEAN-
6 (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, and 
Thailand) and the CMLV grouping (Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and 
Vietnam, or collectively “CMLV”).  The 2016 ASEAN Investment Report 
notes that “[t]he performance of ASEAN Member States differed in attracting 
FDI; five received higher inflows, two had inflows at a level similar to that of 
2014, and three witnessed a decline.”30  Key findings of the 2016 ASEAN 
Investment Report include, among others: (1) a marked rise of FDI in 
manufacturing and all-time highs in equity capital financing of FDI activities, 
combined with strong regional investment expansion by multinational 
enterprises (“MNEs”); 31  (2) intra-ASEAN investment and mergers and 
acquisitions (“M&As”) remain the largest source of FDI flows;32 (3) investor 
perceptions improved after the launch of the AEC in December 2015;33 (4) 
ASEAN is a major FDI destination for South Korea as part of its value chain 
activities;34 (5) ASEAN is the largest host for United States companies in 
Asia, with over 1500 American companies operating in ASEAN and an 
expanding MNE regional footprint in ASEAN using the region as a 
production platform, a site for sourcing operations, and a base from which to 
                                                          
Release, TPP Ministers of Australia et al., Trans-Pacific Partnership Ministerial Statement (Nov. 11, 2017), 
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/news/Pages/trans-pacific-partnership-ministerial-statement.aspx. 
29 See Owen, supra note 4; Keiko Ujikane, Japan Shifts Investment from China to Southeast Asia, 
BLOOMBERG (May 30, 2016, 2:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-30/southeast-
asia-is-winning-more-japanese-investment-than-china. 
30 ASEAN INVESTMENT REPORT 2016, supra note 9, at xv. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at xvii. 
34 Id. at xviii–xix. 
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sell to regional and global markets;35 and (6) micro-, small-, and medium-
sized enterprises (“MSMEs”) remain key economic actors in all ASEAN 
Member States, with MSMEs often operating as contract manufacturers for 
local and foreign MNEs and later internationalizing themselves as FDI 
exporters to other countries.36 
 
The AEC’s Consolidated Strategic Action Plan for 2025 identifies 
various actions and measures to achieve the overall objective of “enhanc[ing] 
further ASEAN’s attractiveness as an investment destination globally through 
the establishment of an open, transparent[,] and predictable investment regime 
in the region.”37  These include: (1) completing the built-in agenda of the 
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (“ACIA”), which is 
applicable to all ten ASEAN Member States, including the elimination or 
improvement of investment restrictions and impediments; (2) identifying 
appropriate mechanisms to phase out and reduce the ACIA reservation lists; 
(3) continuing and enhancing the work of the ASEAN Coordinating 
Committee on Investment (“CCI”), specifically its peer review mechanism; 
and (4) jointly promoting the ACIA and ASEAN, the latter as an “investment 
destination.”38 
 
Within the current structure of the AEC, there is no standing regional 
investment institution that is centrally responsible for investment promotion, 
monitoring, or oversight among the ASEAN Member States.  Rather, it is the 
ASEAN Investment Area (“AIA”) Council that is the “[m]inisterial body 
under the ASEAN Economic Ministers responsible for overseeing the 
implementation of the [ACIA], ASEAN’s main economic instrument to 
realise a free and open investment regime.”39  The Council “is composed of 
Ministers from the ten Member States responsible for investment and the 
Secretary-General of ASEAN.” 40  The CCI supports the AIA Council in 
carrying out its functions and is composed of senior investment officials and 
officials from other government agencies.41 
 
                                                          
35 Id. at xx–xxii. 
36 Id. at xxii–xxxi. 
37 ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community 2025 Consolidated Strategic Action Plan, at 7 (Feb. 6, 
2017), http://asean.org/storage/2017/02/Consolidated-Strategic-Action-Plan.pdf. 
38 Id. at 7–8. 
39 ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) Council, ASEAN, http://asean.org/asean-economic-
community/asean-investment-area-aia-council/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2018). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
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Notwithstanding the lack of any standing formal regional body or 
institution to oversee the harmonization of investment regulations within and 
between ASEAN Member States, ASEAN Member States have ambitiously 
enacted several regional investment treaties, distinct and separate from each 
state’s continuing respective bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”) program.42  
Historically, the top sources of ASEAN FDI inflows are the European Union, 
Japan, ASEAN, China, Hong Kong, the United States, South Korea, Australia, 
Taiwan, and India.43  ASEAN’s foremost sources of FDI inflows from 2013–
2015 are as follows:44 
 
Partner Country/Region 2013 Percentage Share 
of Total Net Inflows 
2014 Percentage Share 
of Total Net Inflows  
2015 Percentage Share 
of Total Net Inflows 
ASEAN 15.7 17.0 18.4 
Australia 2.1 4.8 4.3 
Canada 0.7 1.3 0.7 
China 5.1 5.4 6.8 
European Union (28) 19.6 19.2 16.7 
India 1.7 0.5 1.3 
Japan 19.8 12.1 14.5 
New Zealand 0.3 0.4 1.9 
Pakistan  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Republic of Korea 3.4 4.4 4.7 
Russian Federation 0.5 0.1 0.0 
United States 5.7 11.3 11.3 
Others 25.4 23.6 19.3 
Total FDI Inflows to 
ASEAN 
100 100 100 
 
According to UNCTAD, there are sixteen listed investment treaties to 
which ASEAN is a party.45  This Article focuses on scrutinizing the structure, 
commitments, and institutional design provided in the six regional investment 
treaties concluded under ASEAN’s charter-based regime since it came into 
force in December 2008. 46   This Article contrasts these with the draft 
                                                          
42 For other works on ASEAN regional investment treaties, see Diane A. Desierto, Investment 
Treaties: ASEAN, in ASIA RISING: GROWTH AND RESILIENCE IN AN UNCERTAIN GLOBAL ECONOMY 184 (Hal 
Hill & Maria Socorro Gochoco-Bautista eds., 2013); Desierto, supra note 17, at 1018–57. 
43 See Statistics, ASEAN Secretariat, Top Ten Sources of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows in 
ASEAN (Dec. 31, 2014) http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2015/January/foreign_direct_investment_ 
statistic/Table%2027.pdf. 
44 Statistics, ASEAN Secretariat, Foreign Direct Investment Net Inflows in ASEAN from Selected 
Partner Countries/Regions (Oct. 5, 2016), http://asean.org/storage/2015/09/Table-26_oct2016.pdf. 
45 International Investments Agreement Navigator: ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations), 
UNCTAD INV. POL’Y HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryGroupingTreaties/ 
15#iiaInnerMenu (last visited Feb. 23, 2018). 
46 See ASEAN Charter (entered into force Dec. 15, 2008), http://agreement.asean.org/media/ 
download/20160509062115.pdf. The Charter further requires “Member States [to] take all necessary 
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investment chapter of the proposed RCEP47 (where all ten ASEAN Member 
States are negotiating parties) and the proposed draft investment chapter of 
the CPTPP (where ASEAN Member States Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Vietnam are parties, 48  while the Philippines 49  and Indonesia 50  are 
contemplating membership).  There are other investment framework 
agreements or investment provisions in other agreements with ASEAN’s key 
economic partners, such as the United States51 and Japan.52   
 
However, these agreements and provisions remain incipient or 
undeveloped.  They are largely agreements set up in principle to agree on 
specific commitments at a later point in time.  This Article will focus on the 
following six specifically negotiated ASEAN regional investment treaties and 
contrast the same with the draft RCEP investment chapter and the draft 
CPTPP investment chapter: (1) the 2009 ACIA, 53  which applies to 
investments made in ASEAN Member States by investors from any other 
ASEAN Member State; 54  (2) Chapter 11 (Investment) of the Agreement 
Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area;55 (3) the 
2009 ASEAN-South Korea Investment Agreement;56 (4) the 2010 ASEAN-
China Investment Agreement; 57  (5) the 2014 ASEAN-India Investment 
Agreement;58 and (6) the 2017 ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement.59 
 
                                                          
measures, including the enactment of appropriate domestic legislation, to effectively implement the 
provisions of this Charter and to comply with all obligations of membership.” Id. art. 5, ¶ 2. 
47 See RCEP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 27. 
48 See CPTPP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 28. 
49 Richmond Mercurio, Philippines Revives Plan to Join Trans-Pacific Trade Bloc, PHILIPPINE STAR 
(Sept. 23, 2017, 4:00 PM), http://www.philstar.com/business/2017/09/24/1741930/philippines-revives-plan-
join-trans-pacific-trade-bloc. 
50 Indonesia Reconsidering TPP Plans, Eyes Bilateral Deals, REUTERS (Jan. 25, 2017, 3:26 AM), 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-trade/indonesia-reconsidering-tpp-plans-eyes-bilateral-deals-
idUKKBN15918X. 
51 Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement Between the United States of America and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Aug. 25, 2006, T.I.A.S. No. 06-825.1 https://ustr.gov/sites/default/ 
files/uploads/agreements/tifa/asset_upload_file932_9760.pdf [hereinafter US-ASEAN TIFA]. 
52 Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Partnership Among Japan and Member States of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Apr. 14, 2008, Treaty No. 5, 2008 Jōyaku web 103, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/asean/agreement.pdf [hereinafter ASEAN-Japan FTA]. 
53 ACIA, supra note 21. 
54 See JULIEN CHAISSE & SUFIAN JUSOH, THE ASEAN COMPREHENSIVE INVESTMENT AGREEMENT: 
THE REGIONALISATION OF LAWS AND POLICY ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 72–73 (2016). 
55 ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22. 
56 ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24. 
57 ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23. 
58 ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note 25. 
59 ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement, supra note 26. 
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A careful understanding of the above treaties alongside ASEAN 
Member States’ prospective commitments in the RCEP and the CPTPP is 
critical in light of the AEC’s ongoing development and its distinct path to 
economic integration.60  The free flow of investment in ASEAN is the third 
core element of the envisaged ASEAN single market and production base 
under the AEC, together with the other core elements of free flow of goods, 
the free flow of services, the freer flow of capital, and the free flow of skilled 
labor.61  Accordingly, the AEC Blueprint explicitly recognizes that a free and 
open investment regime “is key to enhancing ASEAN’s competitiveness in 
attracting foreign direct investment as well as intra-ASEAN investment.”62   
 
To achieve this regime, the AEC Blueprint mandates the establishment 
of “more transparent, consistent[,] and predictable investment rules, 
regulations, policies and procedures,” 63  to be undertaken through the 
following specific enumerated actions: 
 
i.  Harmonise, where possible, investment policies to achieve 
industrial complementation and economic integration; 
ii.  Streamline and simplify procedures for investment 
applications and approvals; 
iii.  Promote dissemination of investment information: rules, 
regulations, policies and procedures, including through one-stop 
investment centre or investment promotion board; 
iv.  Strengthen databases on all forms of investments covering 
goods and services to facilitate policy formulation; 
v.  Strengthen coordination among government ministries and 
agencies concerned; 
vi. Consultation with ASEAN private sectors to facilitate 
investment; and 
vii.  Identify and work towards areas of complementation 
ASEAN-wide as well as bilateral integration.64 
 
                                                          
60 See Diane A. Desierto, ASEAN’s Constitutionalization of International Law: Challenges to 
Evolution Under the New ASEAN Charter, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 268 (2011); MICHAEL G. PLUMMER, 
ASEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: TRADE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, AND FINANCE 1–16 (2009). 
61 AEC Blueprint 2025, supra note 3, ¶¶ 9, 11, 16, 19. 
62 ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, ¶ 23 (Nov. 20, 2007), http://www.asean.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/images/archive/5187-10.pdf [hereinafter AEC Blueprint 2007]. 
63 Id. ¶ 28. 
64 Id. ¶ 28(i)–(vii). 
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ASEAN’s regional investment agreements (as contained in distinct 
international investment agreements (“IIAs”) or investment chapters in 
ASEAN free trade agreements (“FTAs”), as well as the individual ASEAN 
Member States’ BIT programs and investment chapters in their respective 
FTAs) collectively form the key legal foundations of ASEAN’s emerging 
regional investment policies.  The European Union (“EU”), much unlike 
ASEAN, is still in the process of defining its architectural “comprehensive 
European international investment policy”65 and debating proposed investor-
state dispute settlement innovations such as the creation of a “global 
investment court.”66  ASEAN is the only regional organization in the world to 
date that has swiftly concluded six regional investment agreements, as either 
stand-alone investment treaties or investment chapters in ASEAN FTAs.67 
 
As of this writing, ASEAN is still exploring other possible regional 
investment agreements, albeit at different stages of political dialogue.  It is in 
negotiations with the EU.  Notwithstanding the EU’s bilateral FTAs with 
individual ASEAN Member States (such as Singapore 68 ), the EU has 
indicated interest in a future region-to-region FTA.69  The United States has 
previously shown interest in a trade and investment partnership with ASEAN 
through the Obama Administration’s Expanded Economic Engagement 
(“E3”) Initiative, which sought to address investor protection.70  Trade and 
                                                          
65 See Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards a Comprehensive European 
International Investment Policy, at 2, COM (2010) 343 final, July 7, 2010, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ 
doclib/docs/2010/july/tradoc_146307.pdf. 
66 See Shawn Donnan, EU Calls for Global Investment Court, FIN. TIMES (May 5, 2015), 
https://www.ft.com/content/c1f2c4b2-f34a-11e4-8141-00144feab7de; see also Commission Concept Paper 
on Investment in TTIP and Beyond—The Path for Reform: Enhancing the Right to Regulate and Moving from 
Current Ad Hoc Arbitration Towards an Investment Court (May 5, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ 
doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF. 
67 See Desierto, supra note 17, at 1020–22. 
68 See Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore ch. 9, 
negotiations concluded Oct. 17, 2014 (not yet signed), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/october/ 
tradoc_152844.pdf [hereinafter Draft EU-Singapore FTA]. 
69 See Foreign Ministers Rekindle Interest in EU-ASEAN FTA, ASEAN BRIEFING (Aug. 4, 2014), 
https://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/2014/08/04/foreign-ministers-rekindle-interest-eu-asean-fta.html; 
Press Release, Dep’t for Bus., Innovation & Skills, EU Agrees Mandates for Negotiations on Investment with 
China and with the ASEAN Member Countries (Oct. 18, 2013) (UK), https://www.gov.uk/ 
government/news/eu-agrees-mandates-for-negotiations-on-investment-with-china-and-with-the-asean-
member-countries. 
70 There is no FTA between the United States and ASEAN to date, with parties still proceeding under 
the 2006 TIFA. See US-ASEAN TIFA, supra note 51; see also Murry Hiebert, The E3 Initiative: The United 
States and ASEAN Take a Step in the Right Direction, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Dec. 21, 2012), 
http://csis.org/publication/e3-initiative-united-states-and-asean-take-step-right-direction. Several ASEAN 
Member States (Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam) were individually engaged in 
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investment negotiations with Canada are being conducted under the 1991 
ASEAN-Canada Economic Cooperation Agreement. 71   
 
It is also critical to stress at the outset that each ASEAN Member State 
maintained its respective BIT program (either in the form of stand-alone BITs 
or as investment chapters in a Member State’s own FTAs with other partners) 
in addition to ASEAN’s regional investment agreements.  As of this writing, 
there are a total of 644 BITs or investment chapters in FTAs from all ten 
ASEAN Member States.72  No reported investor-state dispute has yet arisen 
from any of the ASEAN regional investment treaties.73 
 
Part III of this Article will compare and contrast the ASEAN regional 
investment treaty provisions with provisions of the draft RCEP investment 
chapter on the following matters: (1) the definition of “investment” and 
                                                          
negotiations with the United States on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement prior to 2017. See Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/trans-pacific-partnership (last visited Feb. 27, 2018). 
71 See Joint Declaration Between ASEAN and Canada on Trade and Investment, Oct. 2, 2011, 
http://www.asean.org/storage/2012/05/2011-10-02-ASEAN-Canada-Joint-Declaration-on-Trade-and-
Investment-FINAL-As-adopted-by-Ministers-on-October-2-2011.pdf. 
72 Data aggregated as of March 31, 2015, through IIA databases provided by UNCTAD. See IIA 
Databases, UNCTAD, http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20 
(IIA)/IIA-Tools.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2018). Brunei Darussalam has eight BITs (five of which are in 
force) and seventeen investment chapters in FTAs (fifteen of which are in force). Id. Cambodia has twenty-
one BITs (eleven of which are in force) and fifteen investment chapters in FTAs (thirteen of which are in 
force). Id. Indonesia has sixty-four BITs (forty-six of which are in force) and fifteen investment chapters in 
FTAs (thirteen of which are in force). Id. However, Indonesia has recently announced its inclination to 
terminate, suspend, or review its pre-existing investment treaty program. See Ben Bland & Shawn Donnan, 
Indonesia to Terminate More Than 60 Bilateral Investment Treaties, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014), 
https://www.ft.com/content/3755c1b2-b4e2-11e3-af92-00144feabdc0. Laos has twenty-four BITs (nineteen 
of which are in force) and sixteen investment chapters in FTAs (thirteen of which are in force). IIA Databases, 
supra. Malaysia has sixty-nine BITs (fifty of which are in force) and twenty-two investment chapters in FTAs 
(nineteen of which are in force). Id. Myanmar has eight BITs (five of which are in force) and fifteen 
investment chapters in FTAs (twelve of which are in force). Id. The Philippines has thirty-seven BITs (thirty-
one of which are in force) and fourteen investment chapters in FTAs (twelve of which are in force). Id. 
Singapore has forty-five BITs (thirty-eight of which are in force) and twenty-seven investment chapters in 
FTAs (twenty-five of which are in force). Id. Thailand has thirty-nine BITs (thirty-six of which are in force) 
and twenty-two investment chapters in FTAs (eighteen of which are in force). Id. Vietnam has sixty BITs 
(forty-six of which are in force) and nineteen investment chapters in FTAs (fifteen of which are in force). Id. 
73 The sole arbitration case brought to date under an ASEAN investment agreement is Yaung Chi Oo 
Trading Pte. Ltd. v. Gov’t of the Union of Myanmar, ASEAN I.D. Case No. ARB/01/01, Award (Mar. 31, 
2003), 42 I.L.M. 540 (2003). The case involved pre-ASEAN Charter regional investment instruments, such 
as the 1987 Agreement Among the Governments of Brunei Darussalam, the Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, and the Kingdom of Thailand for the Promotion 
and Protection of Investments; the 1996 Protocol to Amend the Agreement for the Promotion and Protection 
of Investments; the 1998 Framework Agreement for the ASEAN Investment Area; and the 1998 Agreement 
Between the Government of the Republic of Philippines and the Government of the Union of Myanmar for 
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments. Id. ¶¶ 2, 6 83. 
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“investors”; (2) the substantive investment protection treaty standards; (3) 
exceptions, reservations, and other host-state clauses to defend regulatory 
policies; (4) transparency requirements and treaty monitoring or oversight 
institutions (if any); and (5) investor-state dispute settlement options.  Part IV 
discusses particular difficulties that can be anticipated from the continuing 
explosion of ASEAN regional investment treaties without providing for 
mechanisms for legal harmonization on investment protection standards and 
public policy innovations for host-states and omitting to design institutional 
coordination at the regional level for the proper monitoring, oversight, and 
implementation of these regional treaties.  It will also discuss implications of 
the diversity of dispute settlement mechanisms in these regional treaties 
against the broader framework of dispute settlement processes contemplated 
by the AEC.  This includes the ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism, which applies to all “future ASEAN economic 
agreements,” 74  as well as the ASEAN Charter provisions on interstate 
disputes.75  In conclusion, this Article briefly identifies recommendations for 
legal harmonization mechanisms and institutional coordination for ASEAN 
Member States to consider. 
 
III. JUXTAPOSING ASEAN REGIONAL INVESTMENT TREATY POLICY WITH 
THE RCEP AND CPTPP 
 
There are common provisions and similar approaches in the ASEAN 
regional investment treaties and the draft investment chapters in the RCEP 
and CPTPP, which should cause concern over how ASEAN could consistently 
defend the policy and regulatory spaces of the ASEAN Member States at the 
regional level. 
 
A. Definition of “Covered Investment” 
 
The definition of “covered investment” is crucial to determining the 
threshold scope of the applicability ratione materiae of any investment 
treaty.76  The RCEP draft investment chapter defines a “covered investment” 
as: 
 
                                                          
74 ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism, art. 1, ¶ 1, Nov. 29, 2004, 2624 
U.N.T.S. 177, http://agreement.asean.org/media/download/20141217102933.pdf. 
75 See ASEAN Charter, arts. 24–26. 
76 See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., SCOPE AND DEFINITION: A SEQUEL, at 7–19, 
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2010/2, U.N. Sales No. 11.II.D.9 (2011), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia20102_ 
en.pdf. 
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[A]n investment in [the] territory of an investor of another Party, 
which is in existence as of the date of entry into force of this 
Agreement or established, acquired or expanded thereafter, and 
has been admitted, according to its laws, regulations and national 
policies, at that time[,] and where applicable, specifically 
approved in writing by its competent authority.77 
 
Furthermore, the same draft defines “investment” as: 
 
[A]n enterprise constituted, organised and operated in good faith 
by an investor in accordance with the law of a Party in whose 
territory the investment is made, taken together with the assets of 
the enterprise [or] every kind of asset that an investor owns or 
controls, directly or indirectly, and that has the characteristics of 
an investment, including such characteristics as the commitment 
of capital or other resources, certain duration, the expectation of 
gain/s or profit/s, or the assumption of risk . . . and a significance 
for the development of the host State.78 
 
The RCEP draft investment chapter also contains a non-exhaustive 
enumeration of different forms of investment that would be protected under 
this treaty, including: 
 
[S]hares, stocks, bonds and debentures . . . rights under contracts 
. . . [c]opyrights, . . . patents, trademarks, industrial designs and 
trade names, to the extent they are recognized under the law of 
the host State; . . . claims to money or to any contractual 
performance related to a business . . . licences, authorisations, 
permits, and/or similar rights conferred pursuant to domestic . . . 
law of the Host State . . . [and] any other interests of the enterprise 
which involve substantial economic activity and out of which the 
enterprise derives significant financial value.79 
 
The above definitions are almost identical to the definitions of “covered 
investment” and “investment” in the CPTPP draft investment chapter. 80  
                                                          
77 RCEP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 27, at 5 (drafting markups omitted). 
78 Id. at 7 (footnote omitted) (drafting markups omitted). 
79 Id. at 7–9 (footnotes omitted) (drafting markups omitted). 
80 See CPTPP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 28, art. 9.1. 
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Unlike the RCEP draft investment chapter, the definition of “investment” in 
the CPTPP draft investment chapter does not contain any reference to money 
claims, and expressly excludes from its enumerated forms of investment any 
“order or judgment entered in a judicial or administrative action.”81  This is 
similar to an alternative provision in the draft RCEP investment chapter, 
which does contain a clause “for greater clarity,” specifying that “investment” 
does not include certain assets of an enterprise, such as: portfolio investments, 
futures, or debt securities; claims to money arising from commercial sales 
contracts or from the extension of credit in a commercial transaction; 
“goodwill, brand value, market share or similar intangible rights;” or any 
“order or judgment sought or entered in any judicial, administrative, or arbitral 
proceeding.”82  The draft RCEP language defining “covered investment” and 
“investment” resembles treaty language adopted in various other investment 
agreements. 83   They differ distinctly from the CPTPP draft investment 
chapter, which defines “covered investment” and “investment” without any 
legality clauses (e.g. investment is made in accordance with laws of the host-
state 84 ), and also do not consider the significance of the investment’s 
contribution to the development of the host-state. 85   ASEAN’s regional 
investment treaties, together with the RCEP draft investment chapter and the 
CPTPP draft investment chapter, still generally permit a fairly expansive 
asset-based assessment in the forms of investment beyond the traditional 
sources of FDI (e.g. manufacturing operations, greenfield investments, 
utilities and energy concessions, among others). 
 
Definitions of “investors” in the draft RCEP investment chapter and the 
ASEAN regional investment treaties also carefully reflect the diversity of 
nationality, citizenship, and residency requirements as well as the laws of 
Southeast Asian states and their external partners.  The draft RCEP investment 
chapter defines the “investor of a Party” as: 
 
                                                          
81 Id.  
82 RCEP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 27, at 10. 
83 See, e.g., ACIA, supra note 21, art. 4, ¶ 1(a), (c); ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note 
25, art. 2, ¶ 1(e); ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, art. 2, ¶ 1(a), (c); ASEAN-Korea 
Investment Agreement, supra note 24, art. 1, ¶ 1(c), (j); ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 
23, art. 1, ¶ 1(d); ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement, supra note 26, art. 1, ¶ 1(b), (e). 
84 See JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 184–96 (2d ed. 2015) (discussing 
various limitations on definitions of “investment”). 
85 See Diane A. Desierto, Development as an International Right: Investment in the New Trade-Based 
IIAs, 3 TRADE, L. & DEV. 296, 302–06 (2011). 
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[A] Party [or a] state enterprise thereof[, a] national/natural 
person of a Party or a juridical person/an enterprise of a Party, 
that seeks[,] attempts to make, is making, or has made an 
investment in the territory of another Party; provided, however, 
that a natural person who is a dual national shall be deemed to be 
exclusively a national of the State of his or her dominant and 
effective nationality.86 
 
The definition carries a “for greater certainty” footnote, stating that: 
 
[T]he Parties understand that an investor that . . . “seeks[” or] 
“attempts to make” an investment when that . . . investor . . . has 
taken concrete action or . . . active steps to make an investment 
such as channelling resources or capital in order to set up a 
business, or applying for permits or licences.  Where a 
notification or approval process is required for making an 
investment, an investor that “seeks to make” an investment refers 
to an investor of another Party that has initiated such notification 
or approval process.87 
 
This is a more elaborate definition with substantial qualifiers when compared 
to how narrowly “investor” is defined in other ASEAN investment 
agreements. 88   Significantly, Article 9.1 of the CPTPP draft investment 
chapter purposely considers whether States can themselves be deemed as 
investors.89  It should also be noted that, while both the ASEAN regional 
investment treaties and the draft RCEP investment chapter painstakingly 
clarify the respective rules and requirements for citizenship, naturalization, 
and permanent residency that would qualify an individual to qualify as a 
covered investor, as well as rules for juridical persons, none of these 
agreements contain any guidance on the matter of “territory” in which 
                                                          
86 RCEP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 27, at 12 (footnotes omitted) (drafting markups 
omitted). 
87 Id. (drafting markups omitted). 
88 See, e.g., ACIA, supra note 21, art. 4, ¶ 1(d) (“[A] natural person of a Member State or a juridical 
person of a Member State that is making, or has made an investment in the territory of any other Member 
State”); ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note 25, art. 2, ¶ 1(f); ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment 
Chapter, supra note 22, art. 2, ¶ 1(d); ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24, art. 1, ¶ 1(k); 
ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, art. 1, ¶ 1(e); ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment 
Agreement, supra note 26, art. 1, ¶ 1(f). 
89 CPTPP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 28, art. 9.1 (“[I]nvestor of a Party means a Party, or a 
national or an enterprise of a Party, that attempts to make, is making, or has made an investment in the 
territory of another Party.”). 
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investment is made.  The CPTPP draft investment chapter does not attempt to 
clarify these aspects.  For a region such as Southeast Asia, which remains 
mired in considerable unsettled maritime and territorial delimitation 
disputes,90 it is concerning that no guidance exists in any of these treaties on 
the interpretation of “territory” in relation to the definition of “investors,” 
“investments,” and “covered investments.” 
 
A notable feature in the ASEAN regional investment treaties is how 
they commonly define “covered investments” subject to Member States’ 
domestic laws, administrative rules and regulations, decisions, and policies.  
The ACIA refers to investments that have “been admitted according to its 
laws, regulations, and national policies.” 91   The ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA 
Investment Chapter describes a covered investment as one “which, where 
applicable, has been admitted by the host Party, subject to its relevant laws, 
regulations[,] and policies.”92   The ASEAN-China Investment Agreement 
expansively defines investment as “every kind of asset invested by the 
investors of a Party in accordance with the relevant laws, regulations and 
policies of another Party in the territory of the latter.”93  It further clarifies that 
the term “policies” is limited to “those affecting investment that are endorsed 
and announced by the Government of a Party, and made publicly available in 
a written form.” 94   Almost identically, the ASEAN-Korea Investment 
Agreement provides for covered investment as that which “has been admitted 
according to its laws, regulations and national policies, and where applicable, 
specifically approved in writing by its competent authority.”95  The ASEAN-
India Investment Agreement likewise refers to investments that have been 
admitted by a Party “subject to its relevant laws, regulations[,] and policies.”96  
The ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement refers to covered 
investments as those that have been “admitted, according to its laws, 
regulations[,] and policies, and where applicable, specifically approved in 
                                                          
90 See Alfred Gerstl & Mária Strašáková, Introduction, in UNRESOLVED BORDER, LAND AND 
MARITIME DISPUTES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: BI- AND MULTILATERAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION APPROACHES 
AND ASEAN’S CENTRALITY 1 (Alfred Gerstl & Mária Strašáková eds., 2017). 
91 ACIA, supra note 21, art. 4, ¶ 1(a). 
92 ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, art. 2, ¶ 1(a) (footnote omitted). 
93 ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, art. 1, ¶ 1(d) (footnote omitted). 
94 Id. art 1, ¶ 1(d) n.1. 
95 ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24, art. 1, ¶ 1(c) (footnote omitted). 
96 ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note 25, art. 1, ¶ 1(b). Although this provision contains 
a clarifying footnote limiting protection to investments “which have been specifically approved in writing 
for protection by the competent authorities” in regard to Thailand, and “in the case of Cambodia and Vietnam, 
‘has been admitted’ means ‘has been specifically registered or approved in writing,’ as the case may be.” Id. 
art 1, ¶ 1(b) n.1. 
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writing by its competent authority.”97  These are almost identical to the RCEP 
draft investment chapter’s formulation for covered investments.  The RCEP 
draft investment chapter attempts to enumerate measures taken by a host-state 
to include “any law, regulation, rule, procedure, requirement or practice[,] 
decision, administrative action, or in any other form affecting investors and/or 
investments.”98  Significantly, the CPTPP draft investment chapter does not 
contain any such reference to “laws, regulations, and policies” in its definition 
of covered investments. 
 
The asymmetric and ambiguous content of the phrase “laws, 
regulations, and policies” in the ASEAN regional investment treaties and 
RCEP draft investment chapter, coupled with its omission from the CPTPP 
draft investment chapter, introduces uncertainty as to the scope of covered 
investments in ASEAN’s regional investment treaty commitments.  The 
purpose of introducing such qualifications of compliance with “laws, 
regulations, and policies” to the scope of covered investment, ordinarily, is 
“to prevent the [BIT] from protecting investments that should not be 
protected, particularly because they would be illegal.”99  However, it is the 
very same breadth and ambiguity of the corpus of “laws, regulations, and 
policies” with which investments are expected to comply.  This could create 
opportunities for denying treaty protections to foreign investors in the future, 
including access to the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism.  
Investment jurisprudence, after all, has lent different contours to the 
interpretation of “in accordance with host state law” clauses.  The host-state 
has the burden to prove the illegality of the investment as a jurisdictional basis 
to deny a foreign investor the applicability of investment treaty protections.100  
Often, these kinds of clauses are narrowly read to require investments to have 
complied with host-state law only at the time of the admission or 
establishment of the investment.101   Early investor-state arbitral decisions 
interpreting these kinds of clauses, such as L.E.S.I. v. Algeria and Desert Line 
                                                          
97 ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement, supra note 26, art. 1, ¶ 1(b). 
98 RCEP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 27, at 13 (drafting markups omitted). 
99 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 46 (July 23, 2001), 42 I.L.M. 609 (2003). 
100 Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award, ¶ 129 (July 12, 2010), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0314.pdf. 
101 Teinver S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 317–
23 (Dec. 21, 2012), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1090.pdf. 
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v. Yemen, both took the position that these clauses only referred to 
“fundamental principles of the host State’s law.”102 
 
The above narrow position has been repudiated in subsequent arbitral 
awards.  The subject-matter scope of “in accordance with host-state law” 
clauses can be classified to span: “(i) non-trivial violations of the host State’s 
legal order, (ii) violations of the host State’s foreign investment regime, and 
(iii) fraud—for instance, to secure the investment or to secure profits.”103  
Inceysa Vallisoletana v. El Salvador treated this type of clause as a critical 
requirement when assessing the existence of a covered investment.104  The 
arbitral tribunal found sufficient grounds for depriving subject-matter 
jurisdiction for the investment’s failure to comply with domestic legal 
principles (i.e. the prohibitions against unjust enrichment and benefiting from 
one’s own wrongdoing) due to the investor’s acts during the bidding 
process.105  The “in accordance with host state law” clause has also been 
argued to encompass criminal acts, such as bribery and corruption,106 as well 
as the host-state’s procedural rules for acceptance and admission of foreign 
investments.107  In Fraport AG Frankfurt Services Worldwide v. Philippines, 
the tribunal also held that when an investment fails to comply with local anti-
dummy legislation, it is less likely to benefit from the coverage of the relevant 
BIT.108   Anderson v. Costa Rica noted that a BIT that contained an “in 
accordance with host-state law” clause was a: 
 
                                                          
102 Desert Line Projects L.L.C v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17, Award, ¶ 104 (Feb. 
6, 2008), 48 I.L.M. 82 (2009); see also L.E.S.I. S.p.A. v. République algérienne démocratique et populaire, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 83(iii) (July 12, 2006), 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C48/DC528_Fr.pdf. 
103 Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, ¶ 165 (Oct. 4,2013) 
(footnotes omitted) (citations omitted), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ 
italaw3012.pdf. 
104 Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, ¶¶ 207, 
252–57 (Aug. 2, 2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0424_0.pdf. 
105 Id. 
106 See TSA Spectrum de Argentina, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/5, Award, 
¶¶ 163–76 (Dec. 19, 2008), 48 I.L.M. 496 (2009). 
107 See H&H Enters. Invs., Inc. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/15, Objections to 
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 44–56 (June 5, 2012), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ 
ita1012.pdf. 
108 Fraport AG Frankfurt Servs. Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/25, Award, ¶¶ 384–87, 396–404 (Aug. 16, 2007), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0340.pdf; see also Fraport AG Frankfurt Servs. Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines, 
ICSID Case No ARB/03/25, Decision on the Application for Annulment, ¶¶ 89–117, 268–69 (Dec. 23, 2010), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0341.pdf (critiquing the prior tribunal’s 
interpretation of Philippine criminal statutes, but finding the analysis adequate for the purposes of declining 
jurisdiction over an investment not made “in accordance with law”). 
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[C]lear indication of the importance that [the States Parties to the 
treaty] attached to the legality of investments made by investors 
of the other Party and their intention that their laws with respect 
to investments be strictly followed.  The assurance of legality 
with respect to investment has important, indeed crucial, 
consequences for the public welfare and economic well-being of 
any country.109 
 
The banking regulations at issue in the Anderson tribunal decision were one 
type of state law with which investments must comply to benefit from treaty 
protection.110  However, arbitral tribunals have not construed all domestic 
laws to fall within the ambit of “in accordance with host state law” clauses so 
as to deny treaty protection to investments.111  Inmaris Perestroika Sailing 
Maritime Services GmbH v. Ukraine, for example, illustrated that failure to 
comply with domestic laws on the mandatory registration of investments did 
not necessarily render investments illegal when domestic law did not provide 
for this consequence.112 
 
Finally, the recurring references to domestic law throughout ASEAN’s 
regional investment commitments cause difficulty when determining the 
precise content of the local policy or domestic law to which the “covered 
investment” is supposed to conform.  One should bear in mind that ASEAN 
Member States include a vast number of legal regimes, traditions, and systems 
of government.113  It is not readily evident how much of domestic law is 
contemplated—does “covered investment” refer not just to investment 
statutes and administrative issuances, but also to related statutes on 
environment, labor laws, social laws, corporate reportorial requirements, 
among others?  Undertaking the comparative work to identify the relevant 
domestic laws of the ASEAN Member States would conceivably impose 
significant costs on the process of attracting investment. At the very least, 
                                                          
109 Anderson v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/3, Award, ¶ 53 (May 19, 2010), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0031.pdf. 
110 Id. ¶¶ 55–57. 
111 See Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Award, ¶ 97 (July 26, 2007), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0866.pdf (rejecting minor administrative 
defects as a basis to show the illegality of an investment). 
112 Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Mar. Servs. GmbH v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/8, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 145 (Mar. 8, 2010), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/ 
C320/DC1490_En.pdf. 
113 See Legal Systems in ASEAN, ASEAN L. ASS’N, http://www.aseanlawassociation.org/legal.html 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2018). 
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prospective foreign investors now conducting their due diligence in ASEAN 
Member States would have to include the content of domestic laws a priori to 
evaluate the actual protection afforded by ASEAN’s regional investment 
treaties and prospective commitments under the RCEP draft investment 
chapter and CPTPP draft investment chapter.114  More importantly, the lack 
of clarity and harmonization in how ASEAN treats the scope of “covered 
investments” could give rise to claims that some external partners are 
ultimately favored and given better access to investment protection by 
ASEAN than other external partners. 
 
B. Substantive Investment Protection Standards 
 
The RCEP draft investment chapter provides very detailed clauses, 
consolidated criteria, tests, and footnoted clarifications on extending 
protections to investors and investments based on national treatment,115 most-
favored-nation treatment,116 and minimum standard of treatment.117  In regard 
to the national treatment standard, for example, the RCEP draft investment 
chapter defines national treatment as the obligation to: 
 
[A]ccord to investors of another/the other Party, and to covered 
investments of investors of any other Party[,] treatment no less 
favorable than that it accords through its measures, in like 
circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the 
establishment, . . . acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, 
operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its 
territory.118 
 
However, the next provision in that same Article states: 
 
A determination of whether investments or investors are in “like 
circumstances” should be made, based upon an objective 
assessment of all circumstances on a case-by-case basis, 
including, inter alia: 
                                                          
114 As of this writing, the only handbook on an ASEAN regional investment treaty does not contain any 
index on the relevant domestic laws that may apply, nor does it contain any references or authorities for 
investors to locate such domestic laws. See ASEAN SECRETARIAT, ASEAN COMPREHENSIVE INVESTMENT 
AGREEMENT: A GUIDEBOOK FOR BUSINESSES AND INVESTORS (2d ed. 2015). 
115 RCEP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 27, at 1618. 
116 Id. at 1820. 
117 Id. at 20–22. 
118 Id. at 16–17 (drafting markups omitted). 
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i.  the sector the investor is in; 
ii.  the location of the investment; 
iii.  the aim of the measure concerned; and 
iv.  the regulatory process generally applied in relation to the 
measure concerned.  The examination shall not be limited or 
biased towards any one factor.119 
 
The most-favored nation (“MFN”) standard is the obligation to “accord to 
investors of another/any other Party treatment no less favourable than that it 
accords, in like circumstances, to investors of any other Party or . . . non-Party 
with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, 
conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its 
territory.”120  However, the RCEP draft investment chapter also sets forth 
matters that will not be subject to MFN treatment, such as “any preferential 
treatment accorded to investors and/or their investments under any existing 
bilateral, regional[,] and/or international agreements or any forms of 
economic or regional cooperation with any non-Party;” as well as “any 
existing or future preferential treatment accorded to investors and/or their 
investments in any agreement or arrangement between or among ASEAN 
Member States.”121  The minimum standard of treatment is spelled out in the 
RCEP draft investment chapter as a duty of all parties not to: 
 
[S]ubject Covered Investments made by investors of the other 
Party to measures which constitute a violation of customary 
international law, through: 
 
i.  denial of justice in any judicial or administrative 
proceedings; or 
ii.  fundamental breach of due process; or 
iii.  targeted discrimination on manifestly unjustified grounds, 
such as gender, race or religious belief; or 
iv.  manifestly abusive treatment, such as coercion, duress and 
harassment.122 
 
The same provision continues on to detail specific provisions prescribing fair 
and equitable treatment, full protection, and security, among other things.  
                                                          
119 Id. at 17. 
120 Id. at 18–19 (drafting markups omitted). 
121 Id. at 19. 
122 Id. at 20 (footnote omitted). 
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Most significantly, the draft RCEP investment chapter articulates the parties’ 
express understanding that “each Party has different forms of administrative, 
legislative and judicial systems and that each Party at different levels of 
development may not achieve the same standards at the same time,” noting 
that the minimum standard of treatment provision “does not establish a single 
international standard in this context.”123 
 
In contrast, the CPTPP draft investment chapter contains fewer detailed 
qualifications in its standards for investment protection than the RCEP draft 
investment chapter.  The CPTPP draft investment chapter’s traditional 
formulation of national treatment determines the required treatment “in like 
circumstances” according to the “totality of circumstances, including whether 
the relevant treatment distinguishes between investors or investments on the 
basis of legitimate public welfare objectives,” 124  without explaining the 
conceptual parameters of such “legitimate public welfare objectives.”  The 
MFN treatment standard is liberal in scope and is only barred from application 
to dispute resolution mechanisms.125  This is intended to avoid controversies 
over third parties accessing the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism 
through MFN clauses.126 
 
There is even more disparity between the substantive investment 
protection standards in the RCEP investment chapter and the more concise 
and restrained language in the ASEAN regional investment treaties.127  Unlike 
these provisions in the ASEAN regional investment treaties which are largely 
confined to definitions of the treaty standards and express exclusions (e.g., 
ruling out subject matter not covered by the treaty standard), the RCEP draft 
investment chapter provides determinative tests clearly intended to guide the 
task of interpreting treaty standards.  Similarly, the more recent ASEAN-
Hong Kong Investment Agreement followed the RCEP model by limiting the 
application of MFN treatment with qualifications and determinative tests,128 
                                                          
123 Id. at 21–22. 
124 CPTPP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 28, art. 9.4 & n.14. 
125 Id. art. 9.5, ¶ 3 (“For greater certainty, the treatment referred to in this Article does not encompass 
international dispute resolution procedures or mechanisms, such as those included in Section B (Investor-
State Dispute Settlement).”. 
126 See Martins Paparinskis, MFN Clauses and International Dispute Settlement: Moving Beyond 
Maffezini and Plama?, ICSID REV., Fall 2011, at 14. 
127 See ACIA, supra note 21, arts. 5, 6, 11; ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, 
arts. 4, 6; ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24, arts. 3–4, 6; ASEAN-India Investment 
Agreement, supra note 25, arts. 3, 7; ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, arts. 4–5, 7. 
128 See ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement, supra note 26, art. 4, ¶ 3(a), (b) (excluding MFN 
treatment for “(a) preferential treatment accorded to investors or their investments under any existing 
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as well as by providing for a much narrower scope to the protection afforded 
under the fair and equitable treatment (“FET”) standard and full protection 
and security (“FPS”) standard.129 
 
C. Exceptions, Reservations, and Other Host-State Calibration 
Clauses 
 
Similar to the ASEAN regional investment treaties’ detailed exceptions 
provisions, reservations clauses, and other clauses intended to calibrate the 
host-state’s regulatory discretion and policy space, 130  the RCEP draft 
investment chapter contains extensive provisions designed to protect the host-
state’s right to regulate.  These include more restrictions on the applicability 
of the RCEP draft investment chapter, such as the right to exclude government 
procurement measures, subsidies or grants; state aid or financial assistance in 
pursuit of legitimate public purposes (such as health, safety, and the 
environment); and taxation measures.131  The RCEP draft investment chapter 
also contains a separate Article XX listing detailed reservations and non-
conforming measures,132 legal justifications for host-states to restrict capital 
transfers, 133  and a separate annex to clarify the rules on expropriation 
(including tests for indirect expropriation).134  Unlike the ASEAN regional 
investment treaties, the draft RCEP investment chapter does not contain 
separate provisions on general exceptions and/or security exceptions.  The 
ASEAN regional investment treaties usually pattern these exceptions after 
Article XX (General Exceptions) and Article XXI (Security Exceptions) of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”). 
                                                          
bilateral, regional, or international agreements or arrangements or any forms of economic or regional 
cooperation with any non-Party”; and “(b) any existing or future preferential treatment accorded to investors 
or their investments under any agreement or arrangement between or among ASEAN Member States, or 
between or among the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and other customs territories of the 
People’s Republic of China”); id. art. 4, ¶ 5 (excluding MFN for dispute resolution procedures other than 
those set out in this investment agreement). 
129 Id. art. 5, ¶ 1(a) (“[FET] requires each Party not to deny justice in any legal or administrative 
proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process of law”); id. art. 5, ¶ 1(b) (“[FPS] requires each 
Party to take such measures as may be reasonably necessary for the physical protection and security of the 
covered investment”); id. art. 5, ¶ 1(c) (“[T]he concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection 
and security’ do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required under customary 
international law, and do not create additional substantive rights”); id. art. 5, ¶ 2 (“[A] determination that 
there has been a breach of another provision of this Agreement, or of a separate international agreement, does 
not establish that there has been a breach of this Article”). 
130 For a detailed discussion, see generally Desierto, supra note 17. 
131 RCEP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 27, at 2–4. 
132 Id. at 27–30. 
133 Id. at 30–35. 
134 Id. at 42–45. 
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In contrast, the CPTPP draft investment chapter does not make 
extensive use of the above kinds of provisions to protect the host-state’s right 
to regulate.  Rather, it relies on a single provision in Article 9.16 of the 
CPTPP, which does not specify the consequences for a host-state that invokes 
its right to regulate in a manner that breaches investment treaty protection 
standards. The provision states that “[n]othing in this Chapter shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining[,] or enforcing any 
measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate 
to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner 
sensitive to environmental, health, or other regulatory objectives.”135  It is not 
clear from this provision if the host-state adopting, maintaining, or enforcing 
its self-judged regulatory measure would be able to avoid or mitigate liability 
for a breach of investment treaty standards.  The CPTPP draft investment 
chapter does not contain any general exceptions or security exceptions 
clauses.  This contrasts with several of ASEAN regional investment treaties 
that also incorporate exceptions clauses modeled after GATT Article XX 
(General Exceptions) and Article XXI (Security Exceptions).136 
 
Exceptions clauses purposely grafted from GATT Articles XX and XXI 
have not yet been interpreted in investor-state jurisprudence.  The award in 
Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina attempted to apply a GATT 
Article XX-type meaning to a one-sentence non-precluded measures 
clause. 137  However, that approach has been repeatedly critiqued 138  and 
disregarded by most investment arbitral tribunals.  The exceptions clauses in 
the new ASEAN investment treaties are thus likely to be the most recent 
examples of direct transposition of GATT law into investment treaty 
practices.  It would be well within the settled principles of treaty interpretation 
in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties139 to 
                                                          
135 CPTPP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 28, art. 9.16. 
136 ACIA, supra note 21, arts. 17–18; ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, arts. 16–
17; ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24, arts. 20, 21; ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, 
supra note 25, arts. 21–22; ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement, supra note 26, arts. 8–9. 
137 Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 20 (Sept. 5, 2008), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0228.pdf (examining Article XI of the 
Argentina-U.S. BIT). 
138 See DIANE A. DESIERTO, NECESSITY AND NATIONAL EMERGENCY CLAUSES: SOVEREIGNTY IN 
MODERN TREATY INTERPRETATION 171–83 (2012); Diane A. Desierto, Necessity and “Supplementary Means 
of Interpretation” for Non-Precluded Measures in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 827 
(2010); José E. Alvarez & Tegan Brink, Revisiting the Necessity Defense: Continental Casualty v. Argentina, 
in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2010–2011, at 320 (2012). 
139 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31, 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter VCLT]. 
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conduct some examination of GATT law and jurisprudence in interpreting the 
provisions of GATT law grafted into the new ASEAN investment treaties. 
 
While there might well be nothing extraordinary about incorporating 
jurisprudential insights from trade law into investment treaty practices,140 
some caution may be warranted due to teleological and structural design 
differences between the two treaty regimes. 141   The most fundamental 
difference is a matter of remedy.  World Trade Organization (“WTO”) law 
requires the Member State to adjust its policies prospectively to maintain the 
foreign market access guarantees built into the international trade treaties, 
while investment law confers compensation to investors for past economic 
injuries to their investment caused by a host-state’s measures.142  To the extent 
that a WTO Member State can successfully persuade the WTO tribunals 
(Panel or Appellate Body) that the contested measure falls within any of the 
exceptions in GATT Articles XX or XXI, it would not have to revise the 
measure at all.143 
 
On the other hand, if a host-state were to successfully show that its 
contested regulatory measure in an investor-state dispute falls within an 
exception under the general exceptions or security exceptions clauses in the 
new ASEAN investment treaties, would they foreclose any finding of the 
existence of a breach of investment treaty protections (a first-order defense)?  
Would they excuse, suspend, or mitigate compensatory redress available to 
the investor (a second-order defense)?  Would they bar recourse to investor-
state dispute settlement (a third-order defense)?  The exceptions clauses in 
ASEAN regional investment treaties do not resolve any of these questions.  It 
is thus entirely reasonable to expect that foreign investors would not be likely 
to bring their claims under the ASEAN regional investment treaties, where it 
is not clear what the legal consequences are when a host-state invokes a 
general exceptions clause or security exceptions clause in any of the ASEAN 
regional investment treaties. 
 
                                                          
140 See, e.g., Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International 
Investment Law, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2014). 
141 See Diane A. Desierto, Public Policy in International Investment and Trade Law: Community 
Expectations and Functional Decision-Making, 26 FLA. J. INT’L L. 51 (2014). 
142 Id. at 117–33. 
143 For more on general exceptions and security exceptions, see PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW 
AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 597–632 (1st ed. 2005). 
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Finally, it should also be observed that the ASEAN regional investment 
treaties expressly bar the application of the treaty to a closed list of Member 
State measures. 144   These provisions in the ASEAN regional investment 
treaties are difficult to reconcile given evolving understandings of the ordinary 
scope of business practices.  As with any other business entity, income from 
investment operations (usually through onshore corporate activities in the 
host-state) would generally be taxed (subject to any applicable tax treaties or 
exemptions).  Investment operations may likewise include dealing with local 
entities that are supported by subsidies or grants from the host-state.  
Additionally, investment operations may entail contemporary legal 
configurations, such as “public-private partnerships,”145 for the delivery of 
public goods and services, which would ordinarily be subject to government 
procurement and bidding laws.146  Host-state measures in relation to trade in 
services may likewise impact investment operations and overall profitability.  
Carving out these areas automatically from the protective guarantees in the 
ASEAN regional investment treaties conveys that foreign investors would not 
be able to seek recourse under such treaties for a plethora of transactions (and 
interactions with host-state measures) that ordinarily implicate investment 
operations on a periodic basis. 
 
Furthermore, the new ASEAN investment treaties contain detailed 
reservations clauses, which are reflective of possible protectionist tendencies 
and politically sensitive areas. 147   The ACIA acknowledges that national 
treatment protection does not apply to measures indicated in the Schedule 
attached to the ACIA (regardless of whether such measures arise from the 
                                                          
144 ACIA, supra note 21, art. 4, ¶ 1(a)–(e); ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, 
art. 1, ¶ 2(a)–(c); ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, art. 3, ¶ 4(a)–(e); ASEAN-Korea 
Investment Agreement, supra note 24, arts. 2, ¶ 2(a)–(f); ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note 
25, art. 1, ¶¶ 2(a)–(d), 3; ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement, supra note 26, art. 2, ¶¶ 2(a)–(f), 3. 
145 See Catherine Donnelly, Public-Private Partnerships: Award, Performance, and Remedies, in 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 476, 476–77 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 
2010) (“Currently, PPPs are used in various forms across the full gamut of governmental activities from the 
traditional procurement context to complex externalization projects including infrastructure and construction, 
collection of child support payments, management of the federal Medicare programme and state healthcare 
programmes such as Medi-cal, federal student loan programmes, probationary services, schools, prisons, and 
military services.”). 
146 See ANNE DAVIES, ACCOUNTABILITY: A PUBLIC LAW ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT 
19–26 (2001) (demonstrating the inevitable tensions between public interest concerns and government 
contracting practices). 
147 See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., PRESERVING FLEXIBILITY IN IIAS: THE USE OF 
RESERVATIONS, at 39–45, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/8, U.N. Sales No. E.06.II.D.14 (2006), 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiit20058_en.pdf. 
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central, regional, or local government). 148   The ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA 
Investment Chapter likewise denies national treatment protection to various 
measures indicated in two Schedules to Lists I and II to the treaty,149 while the 
ASEAN-India Investment Agreement bars the application of national 
treatment to measures maintained either at central, regional, or local levels of 
government according to schedules of reservations.150  The ASEAN-China 
Investment Agreement denies national treatment and MFN treatment to “any 
existing or new non-conforming measures maintained or adopted within its 
territory” as well as the “continuation or amendment of any [such] non-
conforming measures.”151  As the Agreement does not indicate or describe 
which measures are deemed to be non-conforming, this potentially broad 
carve out also does not appear to be subject to any legal obligation to revise 
the measure to ensure conformity with the Agreement.  At best, the States 
Parties to the ASEAN-China Investment Agreement would simply “endeavor 
to progressively remove the non-conforming measures.” 152   Finally, the 
reservations clause in the ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement appears 
more extensive than the other new ASEAN investment treaties.  It denies 
national treatment protection, MFN treatment protection, and the applicability 
of rules on senior management and boards of directors to non-conforming 
measures indicated in the Schedule of Reservations, continuation or prompt 
renewal of any non-conforming measure, and amendments to such non-
conforming measures.153  National treatment and MFN treatment is likewise 
denied for measures set out in List 2, this time with respect to specified 
sectors, sub-sectors, or activities.154 
 
In principle, reservation clauses comprise fundamental treaty 
mechanisms 155  that could guarantee ASEAN Member States and their 
counterpart states in the new ASEAN investment treaties retain flexibility to 
insulate certain government measures or areas of regulation from 
subordination to international investment treaty obligations.  Nevertheless, 
Member States should also be aware of the corresponding administrative and 
                                                          
148 ACIA, supra note 21, art. 9. 
149 ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, art. 12. 
150 ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note 25, art. 4, ¶¶ 1–6. 
151 ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, art. 6, ¶ 1(a), (b). 
152 Id. art. 6, ¶ 2. 
153 ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24, art. 9, ¶ 1. 
154 Id. art. 9, ¶ 2. 
155 VCLT, supra note 139, arts. 19–23. For an interesting historical account of reservations and the 
interplay of state interests involved in crafting reservations into treaties, see Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, 
31 YALE J. INT’L L. 307 (2006). 
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institutional costs attendant to maintaining reservations to the new ASEAN 
investment treaties.156  Reservations against investment treaty coverage that 
are drawn too specifically and without the necessary adjustment and review 
clauses may be difficult157 to withdraw or amend in the future.  Such clauses 
could hinder the ASEAN Economic Community’s evolution and development 
of further investment objectives and policies, including investment promotion 
plans, regulatory incentives, and other legal protections to attract more inward 
direct investment to ASEAN.158  Investments in services sectors, for example, 
which are often the subject of many reservations clauses in investment 
treaties, could be the next frontier of expansion for the AEC. 
 
Setting out descriptive lists of regulatory sectors and government 
measures to which investment treaty protection standards would not apply 
likewise interrelates the administrative function of treaty oversight with the 
interpretive function of determining the scope of applicability of a legal 
obligation (e.g., the investment treaty protection standard) to a given 
transaction.  Complex, multi-stage investment projects159 and the regulatory 
umbrella that extends over the entire project or operation may not be easily 
compartmentalized for an arbitral tribunal or local court tasked with deciding 
an investor-state dispute.  A reservations clause may apply to one aspect of 
the investment project and not the other, but the investor injury asserted may 
be integral or holistic in nature (e.g., a drop in shareholding prices for the 
holding company that manages the complex, multi-stage investment project).  
To the extent that the ASEAN regional investment treaties deliberately 
reserve various measures and sectors from treaty protection, a counterpart 
institutional or administrative structure within the ASEAN Secretariat/CCI 
may also be necessary to monitor and contextualize the implementation of 
these clauses. 
 
The ASEAN regional investment treaties also contain virtually 
identical language with respect to permissible restrictions on capital transfers 
and measures to safeguard balance of payments.  A treaty party could “prevent 
or delay a transfer” upon the nondiscriminatory and good-faith application of 
                                                          
156 RCEP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 27, at 70. 
157 See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session, Guide to Practice on 
Reservations to Treaties, art. 2.5, U.N. Doc. A/66/10 (2011), reprinted in [2011] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1, 
22, A/CN.4/SER.A/2011/Add.1 (Part 2). 
158 For more on measures for encouraging inward direct investment, see PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES & THE LAW 216–62 (2d ed. 2007). 
159 See ASWATH DAMODARAN, THE DARK SIDE OF VALUATION: VALUING YOUNG, DISTRESSED, AND 
COMPLEX BUSINESSES 125–26 (2d ed. 2009). 
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its domestic laws, such as those on bankruptcy, securities regulation, criminal 
offences, financial reporting, enforcement of administrative or judicial 
decisions, taxation, social security, labor claims, and other domestic 
requirements by central banks or other relevant authorities that would permit 
restrictions on transfers.160  Further non-conforming measures may also be 
contemplated in “exceptional circumstances” such as “serious economic or 
financial disturbance” or other similar balance of payments difficulties.161  
These provisions permit the Member States to impose restrictions on capital 
transactions and transfers relating to covered investments in development or 
financial crises situations that are largely self-judged162 by the Member States.  
The desire to maintain governmental control over monetary flows, even while 
attempting to liberalize investment, is particularly understandable for a region 
that bore the brunt of the Asian financial crisis.163  However, these provisions 
also introduce unpredictability to the overall quality of investment protection 
afforded by the new ASEAN investment treaties.  Member States have 
complete discretion to determine whether any given fiscal, financial, 
economic, or developmental situation warrants intervention into the free flow 
of capital transactions and transfers.  Furthermore, the new ASEAN 
investment treaties do not afford any direct investor recourse against the 
potential arbitrariness, illegality, or inconsistency of a Member State’s capital 
and transfer restrictions.  At best, the ASEAN-India Investment Agreement 
calls for joint consultations between treaty parties to review such transfer 
restrictions.164  Even if the measures to safeguard the balance of payments are 
required to be “consistent” with the International Monetary Fund’s (“IMF”) 
Articles of Agreement, the investment treaty provisions remain the controlling 
                                                          
160 Article 13 of the ACIA, supra note 21, contains substantially the same, if not identical, language as 
Article 8 (“Transfers”) of the ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22; Article 10 
(“Transfers and Repatriation of Profits”) of the ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23; Article 
10 (“Transfers”) of the ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24; and Article 11 of the ASEAN-
India Investment Agreement, supra note 25. 
161 Article 16 of the ACIA, supra note 21, contains substantially the same, if not identical, language as 
Article 11 (“Temporary Safeguard Measures”) in the ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24; 
Article 11 (“Measures to Safeguard the Balance of Payments”) in the ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, 
supra note 23; and Article 12 (“Temporary Safeguard Measures”) in the ASEAN-India Investment 
Agreement, supra note 25. The ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22; and the ASEAN-
Japan FTA, supra note 52, do not contain any such provisions. 
162 See Stephan Schill & Robyn Briese, “If the State Considers”: Self-Judging Clauses in International 
Dispute Settlement, 13 U.N.Y.B. 61 (2009). 
163 See, e.g., Michael P. Dooley, Origins of the Crisis in Asia, in THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS: 
ORIGINS, IMPLICATIONS, AND SOLUTIONS 27 (William C. Hunter et al. eds., 1999). 
164 ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note 25, art. 12, ¶¶ 5–6. 
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lex specialis.165  Since the new ASEAN investment treaties leave it entirely to 
the Member States to police the mode and manner of their imposition of 
capital transfer restrictions (e.g., leaving it to the treaty party to determine 
when an economic, fiscal, financial, or developmental situation warrants such 
restrictions, as well as letting the treaty party decide on the proportionality, 
duration, and termination of such restrictions), one can anticipate that 
investors would have to forecast higher risks to their investment because of 
the increased uncertainty whenever an ASEAN Member State imposes 
restrictions on capital transfers.166 
 
The ASEAN regional investment treaties feature unique provisions 
addressing the development concerns between the different ASEAN Member 
States.  The newer ASEAN Member States—Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and 
Vietnam—benefit from different expectations of compliance with the new 
ASEAN investment treaties.  The ACIA recognizes that “commitments by 
each newer ASEAN Member State may be made in accordance with its 
individual stage of development.” 167   Similar formulations appear in the 
ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter,168 the ASEAN-Korea Investment 
Agreement,169 the ASEAN-Japan Investment Chapter,170 the ASEAN-India 
Investment Agreement, 171  and the ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment 
Agreement. 172   Special and differential treatment (“SDT”) is a familiar 
principle in world trade law that permits developing countries to adjust 
policies to conform to trade commitments at a different pace and schedule 
                                                          
165 See Abba Kolo, Transfer of Funds: the Interaction between the IMF Articles of Agreement and 
Modern Investment Treaties: A Comparative Law Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 343, 362–68 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2011). 
166 See Diane A. Desierto & Desiree A. Desierto, Investment Pricing and Social Protection: A Proposal 
for an ICESCR-Adjusted Capital Asset Pricing Model, 28 ICSID REV. 405 (2013), for an econometric 
proposal on how to adjust risk estimations for cost of equity in view of host-states’ good faith implementation 
of social protection measures. 
167 ACIA, supra note 21, art. 23, ¶ 1(c). 
168 ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, art. 15, ¶ 1(d). 
169 ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24, art. 16, ¶ 1(d) (recognizing that commitments 
by each new ASEAN Member State can be made in line with its respective development policies and 
strategies). 
170 While the SDT provision does not appear in Article 51—the single investment provision—of the 
ASEAN-Japan FTA, SDT is provided for in Article 2, Paragraph 1(c) (“Principles”), which is not contained 
in the investment chapter. ASEAN-Japan FTA, supra note 52, art. 2, ¶ 1(c) (“[S]pecial and differential 
treatment is accorded to ASEAN Member States, especially the newer ASEAN Member States, in recognition 
of their different levels of economic development; additional flexibility is accorded to the newer ASEAN 
Member States”). 
171 ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note 25, art. 16. 
172 ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement, supra note 26, art. 18. 
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than other WTO members.173  However, the incorporation of this provision in 
investment treaties is a relatively recent phenomenon.174  SDT provisions 
have not yet been interpreted in investor-state jurisprudence.  The operation 
of the SDT principle in the new ASEAN investment treaties will foreseeably 
create administrative as well as interpretive ambiguities for counterpart treaty 
parties in the new ASEAN investment treaties.  This is due to the lack of 
monitoring mechanisms and usual schedules of compliance given to other 
Member States by the developing countries covered by the SDT principle in 
world trade law.  While the WTO Secretariat has already taken an interpretive 
position on the content of the SDT principle in various trade agreements,175 
none of the ASEAN Member States or their regional investment treaty 
partners have articulated their understanding of the application of the SDT 
principle in the ASEAN regional investment treaties to expectations of CMLV 
compliance. 
 
To the extent that Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam would be 
able to invoke the SDT principle to adjust their mode and manner of 
compliance with investment treatment obligations and other provisions of 
investment protection in the new ASEAN investment treaties, there should be 
a mechanism for investors and their home states to anticipate, track, and 
monitor the changed quality of compliance for the newer ASEAN Member 
States.  If the SDT principle is envisaged to be an available defense in an 
investor-state dispute, would it operate to prevent investment treaty breaches 
from arising in the first place, suspend the binding effect of investment treaty 
protective guarantees, or simply mitigate any potential liabilities?  None of 
the ASEAN regional investment treaties clarify the precise legal effect of an 
SDT principle.  Considering that the CMLV countries nevertheless retain 
individual BIT programs, it is reasonable to expect that foreign investors 
would prefer to use BITs of the CMLV countries, which generally do not 
contain any equivocal language on treaty compliance such as the SDT 
principle. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
173 SONIA E. ROLLAND, Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO Agreements: A Legal Analysis, 
in DEVELOPMENT AT THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 109 (2012). 
174 See Peter T. Muchlinski, Policy Issues, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 4, 36–38 (Peter T. Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008). 
175 See Committee on Trade and Development, Note by the Secretariat: Special and Differential 
Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions, WTO Doc. WT/COMTD/W/196 (June 14, 2013). 
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D. Transparency Requirements and Monitoring Institutions 
 
The draft RCEP investment chapter contains various transparency 
requirements and incorporates rules on transparency for its investor-State 
dispute settlement provisions consistent with the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Rules on Transparency. 176  
Unlike the ASEAN regional investment treaties, however, the draft RCEP 
investment chapter does not contain separate obligations on information 
transparency and notification of regulatory changes to fellow treaty parties.  It 
does not create a standing treaty monitoring committee or body, but only a 
“Committee for the Settlement of Investment Disputes.”177  The draft CPTPP 
investment chapter likewise does not impose detailed transparency 
requirements, other than to recognize that: 
 
[A] Party may require an investor of another Party or its covered 
investment to provide information concerning that investment 
solely for informational or statistical purposes.  The Party shall 
protect such information that is confidential from any disclosure 
that would prejudice the competitive position of the investor or 
the covered investment.  Nothing in this paragraph shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from otherwise obtaining or 
disclosing information in connection with the equitable and good 
faith application of its law.178 
 
The draft CPTPP investment chapter instead provides for more extensive rules 
on transparency of arbitral proceedings, open hearings, and public access to 
information produced in the arbitral proceedings.179 
 
In contrast, and unlike the usual models of older generations of BITs, 
the ASEAN regional investment treaties reflect the ASEAN Member States’ 
desire to retain a broader scope of public policy discretion.180  Many of the 
ASEAN regional investment treaties’ provisions appear to have been grafted 
from world trade and WTO law, such as GATT Article XX exceptions that 
                                                          
176 RCEP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 27, at 51, 66. 
177 Id. at 70. 
178 CPTPP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 28, art. 9.14, ¶ 2. 
179 Id. art. 9.24. 
180 Indonesia has thus far announced its intention to revise its BIT program. See Grace D. Amianti, 
Govt Revises Investment Treaties, JAKARTA POST (May 12, 2015), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/ 
2015/05/12/govt-revises-investment-treaties.html. 
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would ordinarily call for a state to calibrate or change a trade-restrictive 
measure, but which are instead built into an investment treaty to foreclose any 
state’s liability for breach of investor protections. 181   There is also a 
proliferation of many self-judged provisions that would enable any ASEAN 
Member State to opt out of usual investor treatment protections, such as 
protections for free transferability of capital, without consent of other treaty 
parties,182 as well as provisions referring to “non-discriminatory regulatory 
actions by a Party designed and applied to achieve legitimate public welfare 
objectives, including the protection of public health, safety, and the 
environment,” which are deemed not to constitute expropriation.183  There are 
numerous extensive regional transparency requirements on investors,184 but 
no guarantee to those investors of a centralized regional repository of 
investment regulatory information (e.g., on admission of investments, 
regulatory treatment, and oversight of foreign investments, or potential 
sources of changes to the regulatory framework applicable to foreign 
investment).  Perhaps most unique among multi-party investment treaties,185 
the ASEAN regional investment treaties contain explicit provisions on 
“special and differentiated treatment” 186  for CMLV, the newer ASEAN 
Member States, which do not specify the extent to which these states are 
                                                          
181 See Diane A. Desierto, ‘For Greater Certainty’: Balancing Economic Integration and Investor 
Protection in the New ASEAN Investment Agreements, TRANSNAT’L DISPUTE MGMT., no. 5, 2011, at 1, for a 
detailed dissection of all the public policy provisions across the ASEAN regional investment treaties. See 
also Desierto, supra note 42, 188–89. 
182 See ACIA, supra note 21, art. 13, ¶ 3 (permitting a host-state to delay an investor’s capital transfers 
due to self-judged economic emergencies); id. art. 16 (allowing restrictions on transfers and payments due to 
measures taken by a host-state to safeguard its balance of payments); id. art. 17 (“General Exceptions”); id. 
art. 18 (“Security Exceptions”); ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, art. 3 (permitting 
delay of investor’s transfers in enumerated domestic situations); ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, 
supra note 24, art. 10, ¶ 2 (permitting delay of investor’s transfers); id. art. 20 (“General Exceptions”); id. 
art. 21 (“Security Exceptions”); ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, art. 11, ¶ 1 (permitting 
restrictions on investments and transfers as a measure to safeguard the balance of payments); id. art. 16 
(“General Exceptions”); id. art. 17 (“Security Exceptions”). 
183 ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, annex, ¶ 4; ACIA, supra note 21, annex 
2, ¶ 4. 
184 ACIA, supra note 21, arts. 20, 21; ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, arts. 
11, 14; ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24, arts. 8, 15; ASEAN-China Investment 
Agreement, supra note 23, art. 19. 
185 For example, see Investment Agreement for the 2007 COMESA Common Investment Area, May 
23, 2007, http://www.tralac.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/12/files/2011/uploads/Investment_agreement_for_ 
the_CCIA.pdf (comprising Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe), which does not provide for any special and differentiated treatment principle. 
186 ACIA, supra note 21, art. 23; ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, art. 15; 
ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24, art. 16. 
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permitted to derogate from investor protections in the ASEAN regional 
investment treaties. 
 
The new ASEAN investment treaties generally make it obligatory for 
the Member States to notify and publicize laws, regulations, administrative 
guidelines, and other commitments that would affect covered investments, 
while at the same time allowing Member States to withhold confidential 
information that, in their view, would prejudice public interests.  The ACIA 
obligates the Member States to at least annually inform the AIA Council of 
“any investment-related agreements or arrangements . . . where preferential 
treatment was granted,”187 as well as “any new law or of any changes to 
existing laws, regulations, or administrative guidelines, which significantly 
affect investments or commitments of a Member State.”188  The Member 
States are further obligated to “make publicly available, all relevant laws, 
regulations[,] and administrative guidelines of general application that pertain 
to, or affect investments in the territory of the Member State,”189 and, more 
importantly, to designate an “enquiry point” 190  for such information.  A 
Member State may “require an investor of another Member State, or a covered 
investment, to provide information concerning the investment solely for 
informational or statistical purposes.”191  However, the Member States retain 
the prerogative to restrict disclosure of information in the interests of law 
enforcement, public interest, and the legitimate commercial interests of 
particular public or private juridical persons.192 
 
The ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter contains similar 
transparency rules and restrictive disclosure rules as the ACIA,193 but extends 
transparency rules to administrative proceedings relating to the application of 
all host-state measures of general application covered in the treaty.194  The 
ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, 195  the ASEAN-Korea Investment 
Agreement, 196  and the ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement 197  all 
                                                          
187 ACIA, supra note 21, art. 21, ¶ 1(a). 
188 Id. art. 21, ¶ 1(b). 
189 Id. art. 21, ¶ 1(c). 
190 Id. art. 21, ¶ 1(d). 
191 Id. art. 20, ¶ 2. 
192 Id. art. 21, ¶ 2; id. art. 20, ¶ 2. 
193 See ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, art. 13, ¶¶ 1–8. 
194 Id. art. 13, ¶¶ 9–12. 
195 ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, art. 19, ¶¶ 1–3. 
196 ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24, art. 8. 
197 ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement, supra note 26, art. 7. 
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contain transparency rules and restrictive disclosure rules similarly worded to 
those found in the ACIA.  The ASEAN-India Investment Agreement contains 
similar transparency rules, but also explicitly requires that treaty parties 
“notify the other Parties through the ASEAN Secretariat at least once annually 
of any investment-related agreements or arrangements which grants any 
preferential treatment and to which it is a party.”198 
 
It is laudable that the new ASEAN investment treaties have embraced 
the principle of transparency to ensure regulatory accountability and 
improvement of the Member States’ collective investment environments.199 
Yet, the overall effectiveness of the transparency guarantees could be 
undermined by Member States’ discretion to restrict or prohibit disclosures 
that, in their view, would be prejudicial to public interest, law enforcement, 
or legitimate commercial interests.  Absent a treaty mechanism for testing the 
legality of the host-state’s restriction on the disclosure of information to 
investors or fellow Member States, non-enforcement may altogether 
counteract the obligatory quality of the transparency rules.  Investment 
arbitration jurisprudence accepts the transparency principle as the basis for 
investors to expect that a host-state would act: 
 
[I]n a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally 
transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that it 
may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will 
govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant 
policies and administrative practices or directives, to be able to 
plan its investment and comply with such regulations.  Any and 
all State actions conforming to such criteria should relate not 
only to the guidelines, directives or requirements issued, or the 
resolutions approved hereunder, but also to the goals underlying 
such regulations . . . .200 
 
                                                          
198 ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note 25, art. 14, ¶ 1(c). 
199 See Akira Kotera, Regulatory Transparency, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 174, at 617, 627–28. 
200 Champion Trading Co. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/9, Award, ¶ 162 (Oct. 
27, 2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0148.pdf; see also R.R. Dev. Corp. 
v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, Award, ¶ 219 (June 29, 2012), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1051.pdf; Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican 
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶ 76 (Aug. 25, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001); Saluka Invs. B.V. 
v. Czech Republic, Case No. 2001-04, Partial Award, ¶¶ 420–25 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006), 
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/880. 
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The broad restrictive disclosure carve-outs for the ASEAN Member States 
within the new ASEAN investment treaties, which are not susceptible to 
compulsory oversight or review by either investors or fellow Member States, 
would ultimately make it all too easy to defeat this principle.  As seen from 
the analysis of the foregoing eight common public policy features of the new 
ASEAN investment treaties, there is little safeguard against a Member State 
exercising unconstrained discretion to unilaterally opt out of complying with 
investment protection obligations.  Neither is there any reassurance of an open 
regulatory and information structure that would enable a continuing dialogue 
between the Member States on their mutual exercise of public policy 
prerogatives that might weaken or altogether undercut the qualitative 
protections offered in the new ASEAN investment treaties.  This could lead 
foreign investors to apply older generations of Southeast Asian BITs, which 
contain fewer regulatory carve-outs favoring host-states. 
 
The main remedy for ensuring regular implementation of the public 
policy provisions without regulatory uncertainty or unfettered discretion of 
ASEAN Member States is to ensure transparency and liberalize access to 
information.  Foreign investors cannot realistically expect laws, regulations, 
and policies in ASEAN Member States to remain unchanged and static during 
the life of the investment.  However, foreign investors’ expectations of the 
investment risks and returns with regard to ASEAN are inevitably affected by 
perceptions of the “regulatory restrictiveness” within individual ASEAN 
Member States. 201   Regulatory uncertainty can be mitigated if foreign 
investors and the ASEAN Member States regularly exchange and update 
information on all laws, policies, and regulations that affect the establishment, 
admission, and implementation of investment.202 
 
The new ASEAN regional investment treaties require various indices 
of domestic information in relation to ASEAN Member States’ respective 
domestic legal requirements and measures applicable to the investment during 
                                                          
201 “Regulatory restrictiveness” is measured according to various variables and different methodologies 
aiming to capture the conduciveness of a country or region to foreign investment. See, e.g., FDI Regulatory 
Restrictiveness Index, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/ 
investment/fdiindex.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2018); see also Protectionism, INT’L CHAMBER COM., 
http://www.iccwbo.org/global-influence/g20/reports-and-products/open-markets-index/ (last visited Feb. 25, 
2018). 
202 See Press Release, Council for Asset and Inv. Mgmt., Inst. Int’l Fin., Top 10 Impediments to Long-
Term Infrastructure Financing and Investment (June 2014), https://www.iif.com/system/files/CAIM_ 
Top_10_Impediments_to_LT_Investment_1.pdf (“Concerns about investor/creditor rights, as well as 
potential changes to the regulatory and policy framework over time can discourage long-term investment.”). 
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the life of the investment.  If deliberately or negligently denied by ASEAN 
Member States to a foreign investor, these could also likely give rise to a 
separate actionable claim based on transparency obligations under the 
ASEAN regional investment treaties. 203   The same treaties also contain 
procedural transparency rules applicable to investor-state disputes, such as 
those involving the participation of amicus curiae and access to information 
by non-disputing parties, among others, which are not uniformly granted in 
investor-state arbitral jurisprudence.204  Such information is not only owed to 
foreign investors but also to fellow ASEAN Member States to ensure Member 
States are compliant with obligations to foreign investors under these regional 
treaties.205  These requirements are specified under each regional investment 
treaty and not standardized in a separate treaty, such as the 2014 UN 
Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration 
(otherwise known as the “Mauritius Convention”).206  Because each regional 
treaty has its own corresponding institutional monitoring body as discussed in 
Part I.B., it will be critical for each of the Member States to regularly 
coordinate such information with ASEAN counter-parties and fellow ASEAN 
Member States whose nationals are also entitled to such information.  
Domestic measures will more than likely vary between and across ASEAN 
Member States, since domestic foreign investment legislation and policy 
remains a matter for the ASEAN Member States’ respective national 
competencies. 
 
Given these regulatory disparities in access to information, it would 
best serve the interests of ASEAN Member States to ensure that the ASEAN 
                                                          
203 See Champion Trading Co., Award, ¶ 162 (affirming that an investor could expect the host-state to 
act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity, and provide a transparent regime for its investment, both as 
a matter of investment treaty obligation as well as on the basis of a separate international law principle on 
transparency). 
204 See Joachim Delaney & Daniel Barstow Magraw, Procedural Transparency, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw, supra note 174, at 725; Aguas Argentinas, S.A. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition for Participation as Amicus 
Curiae, ¶¶ 4–7, 21–23 (May 19, 2005), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ 
ita0815.pdf (denying a request to attend hearings of the case, but granting a request for leave to make amicus 
curiae submissions). 
205 See, e.g., ACIA, supra note 21, art. 25, ¶ 1(e) (describing the duty of all ASEAN Member States to 
cooperate on investment facilitation by “strengthening databases on all forms of investments for policy 
formulation to improve ASEAN’s investment environment”); id. art. 26, ¶ 1(c) (describing the duty of all 
ASEAN Member States to “share information on investment policies and best practices, including promoted 
activities and industries”). 
206 United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, opened for 
signature Dec. 10, 2014, 541 I.L.M. 751 (entered into force Oct. 18, 2017); see also G.A. Res. 68/109, 
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration and Arbitration Rules (Dec. 
16, 2013). 
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CCI provide a “one-stop shop” or investment information clearinghouse, 
similar to those implemented by the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(“NAFTA”) Commission 207  and the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (“COMESA”) Regional Investment Agency.208 
 
E. Investor-State Dispute Settlement Options 
 
The draft RCEP investment chapter provides for three key dispute 
settlement options: consultations, negotiations, and arbitration.  The bulk of 
the draft devotes the most attention to the rules for the conduct of arbitration 
proceedings.209  The provisions resemble the investor-state dispute settlement 
options in most of the ASEAN regional investment treaties.210  The 2017 
ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement left its investor-state dispute 
settlement options to future agreement of the parties.211  The CPTPP draft 
investment chapter likewise leaves out any definitive investor-state dispute 
settlement option. 
 
While dispute settlement is an area of ASEAN investment rule-making 
that is still shrouded in uncertainty, some observations can be made about the 
dispute settlement options adopted in the ASEAN regional investment 
treaties.  First, despite certain criticisms of the structure, design, and 
interpretive approaches of arbitral tribunals in the investor-state dispute 
settlement system,212 ASEAN has not repudiated investor-state arbitration as 
one of its investor-state dispute settlement options.  The ACIA provides for 
conciliation procedures, consultations, and submission of investor claims 
                                                          
207 See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, NAFTA Commission Announces New 
Transparency Measures (Oct. 7, 2003), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/ 
archives/2003/october/nafta-commission-announces-new-transparen. 
208 See About Us: COMESA RIA, COMESA REGIONAL INV. AGENCY, 
http://www.comesaria.org/site/en/article.php?chaine=comesa-ria&id_article=56 (last visited Feb. 25, 2018) 
(“[The COMESA] RIA provides a platform for private sector to interact with COMESA Governments and 
serves as an information hub through which it can promote the COMESA region, detailed information on 
legislation and policies affecting the business environment, cost of doing business, investment incentives, 
investment procedures, investment opportunities and projects, major events affecting investment and other 
relevant information. In doing so, RIA works closely with Member States’ Investment Promotion Agencies 
(IPAs) to promote the COMESA region as a Common Investment Area, and in building a positive image of 
the region and its Member States for a worldwide audience.”). 
209 RCEP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 27, at 45–70. 
210 See ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, arts. 13–14; ASEAN-Korea Investment 
Agreement, supra note 24, arts. 18–19; ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, arts. 18–
28; ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note 25, arts. 19–20; ACIA, supra note 21, arts. 28–41. 
211 ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement, supra note 26, art. 20. 
212 See generally RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: JOURNEYS FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY (Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 2015). 
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against host-states to arbitration. 213   The ASEAN-China Investment 
Agreement mandates initial consultations to resolve disputes between 
investors and host-states, and should such consultations fail, the investor is 
given the choice of local court adjudication, administrative tribunals, 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) 
arbitration, UNCITRAL arbitration, or arbitration administered by any other 
institution under any other rules. 214   The ASEAN-India Investment 
Agreement provides for a similar extensive choice of forum for investors, but 
contains strict conditions and limitations to the submission of investor 
claims.215  The ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement requires mandatory 
consultations and negotiations within a six month period before the investor 
can submit his or her claim against the host-state to ICSID arbitration, ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules arbitration, UNCITRAL arbitration, or any other 
arbitration institution, or to local courts or administrative tribunals.216  The 
ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter provides for consultations before 
an investor can choose to submit a claim to local courts or tribunals, ICSID 
arbitration, ICSID Additional Facility Rules arbitration, UNCITRAL 
arbitration, or any other arbitration institution under any other arbitration 
rules.217 
 
Second, it is significant that ASEAN has not built in specific 
preferences for arbitral institutions within ASEAN Member States, such as 
the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”), the Kuala Lumpur 
Regional Centre for Arbitration (“KLRCA”) in Malaysia, the Badan Arbitrasi 
Nasional Indonesia (“BANI”) Arbitration Centre in Indonesia, the Philippine 
Dispute Resolution Centre Inc. (“PDRCI”) in Manila, or the Thai Arbitration 
Institute.  Of these arbitral institutions, SIAC has grown rapidly in the last 
decade, making it one of the world’s foremost dispute resolution hubs.218  
With the proliferation of arbitration centers in Southeast Asia, several of 
which are government-supported, it is not surprising that ASEAN’s regional 
investment treaties continue to emphasize resort to investor-state arbitration 
as the preferred dispute settlement option.  It is more surprising that ASEAN 
regional investment treaties do not specify any of Southeast Asia’s renowned 
                                                          
213 ACIA, supra note 21, arts. 30–41. 
214 ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, art. 14, ¶¶ 1–10. 
215 ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note 25, art. 20, ¶¶ 1–31. 
216 ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24, art. 18, ¶¶ 1–14. 
217 ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, arts. 19–21. 
218 See Laura Philomin, Singapore to Remake Itself as Asia’s Legal Hub with New Commercial Court, 
REUTERS (Feb. 12, 2014, 2:13 PM), https://in.reuters.com/article/singapore-law/singapore-to-remake-itself-
as-asias-legal-hub-with-new-commercial-court-idINDEEA1A0JC20140211. 
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regional arbitration centers, but do explicitly provide for the World Bank’s 
ICSID arbitration. 
 
Third, the linguistic, cultural, political, economic, and institutional 
capacity diversity of court systems in the ten ASEAN Member States create 
additional incentives for foreign investors to insist on submitting their 
disputes to international arbitration.  ASEAN Member States’ court systems 
are not all equally or fully prepared to handle complex regional investments 
and the economic disputes that arise from the influx of cross-border 
transactions.219  In this sense, international arbitration may supply investor 
confidence in stable dispute settlement mechanisms for complex foreign 
investment disputes, even as ASEAN Member States (especially the CMLV 
countries) continue to build national judicial capacities for resolving ASEAN-
law-based disputes. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that ASEAN is not, as of this writing, 
pursuing any regional investment court or regional institutional appellate 
mechanism to handle investor-state disputes.  Consistent with the mandate of 
the ASEAN Charter, the implementation of ASEAN law (e.g., treaties, 
commitments, and ASEAN Summit decisions, among others) remains a 
matter for the individual ASEAN Member States to ensure in their respective 
jurisdictions. 220   The absence of any centralized regional enforcement 
mechanism for arbitral awards based on the ASEAN regional investment 
treaties could militate against the investors’ popular use of these treaties when 
bringing claims against ASEAN Member States. 
 
IV. HARMONIZATION AND COORDINATION PROBLEMS IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN 
INVESTMENT POLICIES 
 
It is not unusual for a state to adopt different investment treaty strategies 
with different counterpart states.  However, Southeast Asian states should be 
concerned with the chaos arising from ASEAN’s multiple approaches to its 
treaty commitments under ASEAN regional investment treaties, the RCEP 
draft investment chapter, and the CPTPP draft investment chapter.  These 
unmonitored differences impact the ability of ASEAN Member States to 
effectively implement these investment treaty commitments in a way that is 
in line with their fundamental obligations under the ASEAN Charter.  Under 
                                                          
219 See Rule of Law in ASEAN: Not All Appealing, ASEAN BRIEFING (June 17, 2015), 
https://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/2015/06/17/rule-of-law-in-asean-not-all-appealing-2.html. 
220 ASEAN Charter art. 5, ¶ 2. 
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Article 5(2) of the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN’s treaties form part of ASEAN 
law, such that ASEAN Member States “shall take all necessary measures, 
including the enactment of appropriate domestic legislation, to effectively 
implement the provisions of this Charter and to comply with all obligations of 
membership.”221  “Obligations of membership”—a phrase undefined under 
the ASEAN Charter—may be reasonably viewed as the “rules of the 
organization” in ASEAN.  The International Law Commission’s 2011 Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations defines “rules of 
the organization” as “the constituent instruments, decisions, resolutions[,] and 
other acts of the international organization adopted in accordance with those 
instruments, and established practice of the organization.”222 
 
Furthermore, the ASEAN regional investment treaties comprise 
decisions of the ASEAN Summit members—the individual heads of state of 
the Member States of ASEAN—to commit to fulfill binding international 
obligations in regard to the management of foreign investment with each other 
and other states among ASEAN’s external partners.223  Moreover, the ASEAN 
regional investment treaties are also binding on all ASEAN Member States as 
part of the wider corpus of external agreements concluded under “the 
centrality of ASEAN in external political, economic, social[,] and cultural 
relations,”224 consistent with its objectives of “upholding . . . international 
law” 225  and adhering to “ASEAN’s rules-based regimes for effective 
implementation of economic commitments.” 226   Because of the positive 
mandate of ASEAN Member States to “take all necessary measures” to 
comply with obligations of membership, such as those contained in the 
ASEAN regional investment treaties, each ASEAN Member State may well 
find itself obligated to take all necessary measures to ensure that its other 
investment treaty commitments—such as those in RCEP and the CPTPP—do 
not undermine ASEAN Member States’ implementation of, and compliance 
with, the ASEAN regional investment treaties. 
                                                          
221 Id. 
222 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session, Draft Articles on the Responsibility 
of International Organizations, with Commentaries, art. 2, ¶ 1(b), U.N. Doc. A/66/10 (2011), reprinted in 
[2011] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1, 46, A/CN.4/SER.A/2011/Add.1 (Part 2). 
223 Cf. SALACUSE, supra note 84, at 13 (“[Investment] treaty texts contain many specific prescriptions 
for action. Thus, in addition to norms, the treaties express rules about such matters as expropriation, monetary 
transfers, and compensation of injured investors because of war, revolution, and civil strife.”). 
224 ASEAN Charter art. 2, ¶ 2(m); see also MARISE CREMONA ET AL., ASEAN’S EXTERNAL 
AGREEMENTS: LAW, PRACTICE AND THE QUEST FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 23–51 (2015). 
225 ASEAN Charter art. 2, ¶ 2(j). 
226 Id. art. 2, ¶ 2(n). 
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As members of the AEC, ASEAN Member States continue to be bound 
by their collective duties under the AEC Blueprint to create “more transparent, 
consistent and predictable investment rules, regulations, policies[,] and 
procedures.”227  The following subsections discuss problems arising from the 
absence of substantive harmonization, institutional monitoring, and regional 
coordination when implementing ASEAN’s regional investment 
commitments in the ASEAN regional investment treaties, the RCEP draft 
investment chapter, and the CPTPP draft investment chapter. 
 
A. Inconsistent Formulation of Foreign Investment Treaty 
Standards in Southeast Asia 
 
ASEAN Member States can potentially undermine implementation of, 
and compliance with, the ASEAN regional investment treaties through their 
respective investment treaty commitments in new investment treaty 
obligations, such as those anticipated in RCEP and CPTPP.  One way is by 
maintaining less stringent conditions in these other treaties that pose fewer 
regulatory burdens on foreign investors, who would practice “jurisdictional” 
or “regulatory” arbitrage.228  The ASEAN-India Investment Agreement or the 
ACIA, for example, which contain more public policy clauses and host-state 
defenses, could fall into desuetude should investors prefer to bring claims 
under the RCEP or CPTPP (which, to date, do not have as many of these 
clauses, reservations, exceptions, or host-state defenses).  Southeast Asia 
investment policy, as contained in the ASEAN regional investment treaties, 
might aspire for the highest “gold” standard in investment protection and 
public interest protection.  Yet, if investors can still avail themselves of other 
regional investment treaties, such as RCEP and CPTPP, which have far fewer 
public interest provisions, the ASEAN regional investment treaties may end 
up being relics of scholarly analysis rather than actual dispute settlement.  
There is a need to undertake regular, close analysis of individual ASEAN 
Member States’ future commitments in RCEP and CPTPP to determine if the 
lower regulatory or compliance burdens in these treaties will end up 
incentivizing foreign investors to choose regulatory arbitrage and invoke 
compliance with the RCEP and CPTPP, rather than the stricter thresholds of 
                                                          
227 AEC Blueprint 2007, supra note 62, ¶ 28. 
228 See NICHOLAS DORN, DEMOCRACY AND DIVERSITY IN FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION 67 (2015) 
(“Jurisdictional arbitrage (alternatively, regulatory arbitrage) refers to financial firms moving from one 
market to another—or conducting particular forms of business in or through some jurisdictions rather than 
others—because of perceived advantages vis-à-vis regulation in or between jurisdictions . . . . [J]urisdictional 
arbitrage requires as its condition of existence that jurisdictions differ in their rules.”). 
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the ASEAN regional investment treaties, which afford more space for public 
policy protection. 
 
The problem worsens when we shift our analytical lens.  ASEAN 
Member States not only have investment treaty commitments under the 
ASEAN regional investment treaties and potential future commitments in the 
RCEP or CPTPP draft investment chapters, but all ten of the ASEAN Member 
States have pre-existing BIT programs (numbering around 600 BITs and FTA 
investment chapters in total for all ten ASEAN Member States).  There 
remains a glaring difference in the narrow formulation of the FET clause 
under the ASEAN regional investment treaties and the broader variants in 
several Southeast Asian BITs.  Article 11, Paragraph 2(a) of the ACIA 
obligates ASEAN Member States to observe FET towards foreign investors 
by merely requiring “each Member State not to deny justice in any legal or 
administrative proceedings in accordance with the principle of due 
process.” 229   Many Southeast Asian BITs, however, do not narrowly 
circumscribe FET in this manner.230  The 1994 Malaysia-Albania BIT states 
that the “Contracting Party shall receive treatment which is fair and 
equitable,”231 without explaining or interpreting the qualitative contours of 
this treatment.  The 1999 Argentina-Philippines BIT states that “[e]ach 
Contracting Party shall at all times ensure fair and equitable treatment of the 
investments by investors of the other Contracting Party and shall not impair 
the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment[,] or disposal thereof through 
unjustified or discriminatory measures.”232  Because of the more expansive 
formulations of FET in the Southeast Asian BITs, the ASEAN Member States 
remain bound to a stricter threshold of investment guarantees of “fair and 
equitable treatment.” This is contrasted with the narrow scope of treatment 
owed to investors under the ASEAN regional investment treaties.  It will not 
be surprising, therefore, if foreign investors claiming compensation for injury 
caused by ASEAN Member States would prefer a more expansive version of 
                                                          
229 ACIA, supra note 21, art. 11, ¶ 2(a); see also ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note 25, 
art. 7, ¶ 2(a); ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, art. 6, ¶ 2(a); ASEAN-Korea 
Investment Agreement, supra note 24, art. 5, ¶ 2(a); ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, 
art. 7, ¶ 2(a). 
230 See Jonathan Brenner et al., Handbook on Southeast Asian BITs app. A (spring 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
231 Agreement Between the Government of Malaysia the Government of the Republic of Albania for 
the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 3, ¶ 1, Alb.-Malay., Jan. 24, 1994, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/22. 
232 Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the 
Argentine Republic on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment art. 3, ¶ 1, Arg.-Phil., Sept. 
20, 1999, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/112. 
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FET in the Southeast Asian BITs, rather than invoking the ASEAN regional 
investment treaties.  It will thus be necessary to examine all Southeast Asian 
investment treaties and their interaction with the ASEAN regional investment 
treaties, the RCEP draft investment chapter, and the CPTPP draft investment 
chapter.  Doing so can help ASEAN anticipate and fully map the 
consequences of Southeast Asia’s inconsistent formulation of foreign 
investment treaty standards. 
 
B. The Problem of MFN Clauses in Southeast Asia Investment 
Treaties 
 
The RCEP draft investment chapter contains an MFN treatment clause, 
which, interestingly, attempts to carve out pre-existing preferential 
arrangements in other treaties from coverage under MFN treatment: 
 
1.  Each Party shall accord to investors of another/any other 
Party treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like 
circumstances, to investors of any other Party or . . . non-Party 
with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of 
investments in its territory. 
2.  Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment 
no less favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to 
investments in its territory of investors of any other Party or . . . 
of any non-Party with respect to the establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other 
disposition of investments in its territory. 
3.  The treatment, as set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2, shall not 
include: 
a) any preferential treatment accorded to investors and/or 
their investments under any existing bilateral, regional 
and/or international agreements or any forms of economic 
or regional cooperation with any non-Party; and 
b) any existing or future preferential treatment accorded 
to investors and/or their investments in any agreement or 
arrangement between or among ASEAN Member States. 
4.  Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2, if a Party accords 
more favourable treatment to investors of any other Party or a 
non-Party of their investments by virtue of any future agreements 
or arrangements to which the Party is a party, it shall not be 
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obliged to accord such treatment to investors of any other Party 
or their investments.  However, upon request from any other 
Party, it shall accord adequate opportunity to negotiate the 
benefits therein. 
5.  For greater certainty, the . . . treatment referred to in this 
Article does not encompass a requirement for a Party to extend 
to investors of another Party any international dispute resolution 
procedures or mechanisms such as those included in Section 
B . . . of this Chapter.233 
 
The CPTPP draft investment chapter does not contain a similar carve-out 
against the applicability of MFN clauses to pre-existing treaty commitments 
of ASEAN Member States.  It simply rules out international dispute resolution 
procedures or mechanisms from MFN coverage.234  There are MFN clauses 
in several of the ASEAN regional investment treaties,235 as well as in many of 
the Southeast Asian investment treaties and FTA investment chapters. 
 
The MFN clause in investment treaties is particularly controversial 
because it serves as the substantive gateway for the incorporation of norms 
from other treaty sources with third-party states.236  These norms may not 
necessarily be just substantive standards of investment protection, but also 
procedural guarantees or benefits extended under the investor-state dispute 
settlement mechanism in an investment treaty.  In Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. 
Kingdom of Spain, 237  the arbitral tribunal interpreted the MFN clause to 
extend to substantive as well as procedural dispute settlement provisions of 
                                                          
233 RCEP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 27, at 18–20 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) 
(drafting markups omitted). 
234 CPTPP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 28, art. 9.5, ¶¶ 1–3. 
235 See ACIA, supra note 21, art. 6 n.4 (excluding application of the MFN clause to dispute settlement 
procedures, but requiring that preferential treatment extended to any investors under existing or future 
arrangements also be granted to parties to the ACIA); ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24, 
art. 4, ¶ 3(a) (excluding MFN treatment to any preferential treatment already accorded in “existing bilateral, 
regional and/or international agreements or any forms of economic or regional cooperation with any non-
Party”); ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, art. 5, ¶ 3(a) (same). The ASEAN-India 
Investment Agreement, supra note 25; ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22; and the 
ASEAN-Japan FTA, supra note 52, however, do not contain MFN clauses. 
236 See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., MOST-FAVOURED-NATION TREATMENT: A SEQUEL, at xiv, 
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2010/1, U.N. Sales No. 10.II.D.19 (2010), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ 
diaeia20101_en.pdf. MFN clauses have also been argued to create a “multilateralizing” effect on investment 
treaties. See Stephan W. Schill, Multilateralizing Investment Treaties Through Most-Favored-Nation 
Clauses, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 496 (2009). 
237 Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award, ¶ 21 (Nov. 13, 2000), 40 I.L.M 
1148 (2001); see also Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Objections to Jurisdiction, 
¶¶ 38–64 (Jan. 25, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 1129 (2001). 
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the applicable BIT.  Given the variable formulations of MFN in the ASEAN 
regional investment treaties, the respective BIT programs, and FTA 
investment chapters of the individual ASEAN Member States, more time and 
resources for comprehensive analysis and bilateral-regional research are 
required to ascertain the precise scope of the MFN clauses simultaneously 
applicable in the ASEAN regional investment treaties, the RCEP draft 
investment chapter, the CPTPP draft investment chapter, and the MFN clauses 
still present in ASEAN Member States’ respective investment treaty 
programs.  The same issue has been noted by the European Parliament.  They 
recognized the serious legal uncertainty created by the overlap between future 
investment policy directed at the regional level through the EU, and the 
continuation of “intra-EU” BITs between EU Member States.238 
 
The gravity of the MFN problem throughout Southeast Asia investment 
treaties (bilateral, regional, or mega-regional, as in the case of RCEP and 
CPTPP), can be illustrated by looking intra-ASEAN BITs that still exist 
alongside the ACIA.  Among its key objectives, the ACIA emphasizes the 
“provision of enhanced protection to investors of all Member States and their 
investments;” 239  the “improvement of transparency and predictability of 
investment rules, regulations[,] and procedures conducive to increased 
investment among Member States;”240 and the “joint promotion of the region 
as an integrated investment area.”241  To accomplish these objectives, the 
ASEAN Member States are obligated to enhance ASEAN integration by 
“harmonis[ing], where possible, investment policies and measures to achieve 
industrial complementation.”242  The ACIA does not provide for any sunset 
clauses or termination of pre-existing intra-ASEAN BITs, as the ACIA 
expressly states that “[n]othing in this Agreement shall derogate from the 
existing rights and obligations of a Member State under any other 
international agreements to which it is a party.”243  In the case of an investor-
state dispute under the ACIA, intra-ASEAN BITs could very well apply, since 
the ACIA entitles the investor-state arbitral tribunal to “decide the issues in 
                                                          
238 See Stephen Woolcock, THE EU APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POLICY AFTER THE 
LISBON TREATY, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES 58–59 ( 2010), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2010/433854/EXPO-INTA_ET(2010)433854_ 
EN.pdf. 
239 ACIA, supra note 21, art. 1, ¶ 1(b). 
240 Id. art. 1, ¶ 1(c). 
241 Id. art. 1, ¶ 1(d). 
242 Id. art. 26, ¶ 1(a). 
243 Id. art. 44. 
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dispute in accordance with [the ACIA], any other applicable agreements 
between the Member States, and the applicable rules of international law.”244 
 
With the simultaneous applicability of the ACIA and intra-ASEAN 
BITs, several issues are likely to arise.  First, given the differences in the 
quality of investment protection afforded between the ACIA and the older 
models of intra-ASEAN BITs, could ASEAN Member States be deemed to 
have “complied” with the ACIA’s duties for all ASEAN Member States to 
harmonize their investment policies to promote the region as an integrated 
investment area?  Continuing deviations from the qualitative standards and 
obligations defined in the ACIA through the individual BITs between ASEAN 
Member States could encourage the de facto inoperability of the ACIA’s 
envisaged level, strategy, and quality of investment protection. 
 
Second, the simultaneous applicability of the ACIA and the intra-
ASEAN BITs muddles the governing law for investor-state disputes under the 
ACIA.  Where there are disparities between the quality of protection afforded 
by an ASEAN Member State under its intra-ASEAN BIT and the quality of 
investment protection that the same ASEAN Member State is obligated to 
extend under the ACIA, it will likely be difficult for the ASEAN Member 
State to muster ACIA-based defenses to investor claims when foreign 
investors decide which investment treaty to invoke for purposes of initiating 
suit.  One can expect that foreign investors will still frame their cause of action 
under the older intra-ASEAN BITs, which often do not contain any of the 
public policy features discussed in Part III.  ASEAN Member States may still 
struggle to find plausible defenses or calibration mechanisms against investor 
claims under the older generation of intra-ASEAN BITs. 
 
Third and most importantly, the continued applicability of the intra-
ASEAN BITs alongside the ACIA could very likely trigger questions of the 
ASEAN Member States’ compliance with their fundamental ASEAN Charter 
duties under Article 5(2) to “take all necessary measures, including the 
enactment of appropriate domestic legislation, to . . . comply with all 
obligations of membership.” 245   By continuing to pursue regulatory 
governance bilaterally (within the framework and purposes of an intra-
ASEAN BIT) despite the existence of the ACIA, it is doubtful an ASEAN 
Member State could indeed be said to have taken “all necessary measures” to 
implement its regional obligations, such as those that were specifically crafted 
                                                          
244 Id. art. 40, ¶ 1. 
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and designed in the ACIA based on the consensus of all ASEAN Member 
States. 
 
Such legal uncertainties likewise permeate other ASEAN regional 
investment treaties.  They also fail to harmonize and coordinate mechanisms 
to govern ASEAN Member States’ duties under their individual BITs with the 
ASEAN regional investment treaty partners without undermining regional 
investment objectives and protections.  For example, the ASEAN-India 
Investment Agreement appears silent on the effects of this regional agreement 
on India’s individual BITs with ASEAN Member States, 246  while the 
ASEAN-China Investment Agreement explicitly recognizes the applicability 
of other international agreements that entitle investments to treatment that 
may be “more favorable” than provided for in the ASEAN-China Investment 
Agreement.247  However, the ASEAN-China Investment Agreement does not 
also apply its favorable public policy features or calibration mechanisms to 
the investors’ entitlement to “more favorable treatment” in China’s older 
individual BITs with the ASEAN Member States.  The ASEAN-China 
Investment Agreement does not contain any language purporting to supersede 
or control the interpretation of investment treaty standards in China’s older 
individual BITs with ASEAN Member States, or to make the same consistent 
with the standards as formulated in the ASEAN-China Investment 
Agreement.  Neither does the ASEAN-China Investment Agreement contain 
any provision creating a regional “sunset clause” for China’s BITs with 
individual ASEAN Member States, thus perpetuating the same problems of 
likely treaty-shopping for foreign investors interested in invoking the highest 
degree of investment treaty protections with the least amount of available 
defenses, mitigation mechanisms, or exculpatory exceptions for host-states. 
 
The ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement contains a similar 
recognition clause regarding other agreements entitling investors to more 
favorable treatment, 248  sans the application of the host-state’s calibrating 
mechanisms made available under the regional agreement.  Just like the 
ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, the ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment 
Chapter also explicitly permits “any other applicable agreements between the 
parties”249 to apply as governing law to investor-state disputes, which could 
                                                          
246 See generally ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note 25. 
247 ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, art. 18, ¶ 1. 
248 ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24, art. 23, ¶ 1–2. 
249 ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, art. 27, ¶ 1. 
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thus usher in Australia’s existing older individual BITs with the ASEAN 
Member States.  New Zealand does not have such BITs. 
 
In sum, treaty standards under the intra-ASEAN BITs and the 
individual BITs of ASEAN regional investment treaty external partners with 
the ASEAN Member States could infuse the content and operation of the 
ASEAN regional investment treaties in three ways.  First, the MFN clauses in 
these treaties open the door for foreign investors to import treatment and 
protections beyond the four corners of the regional investment treaty.  MFN 
clauses in ASEAN Member States’ BITs, in turn, could also result in 
importing standards of protection and treatment entitlements from BITs with 
third states (i.e., states not parties to the ASEAN regional investment treaties), 
which might not have been contemplated when standards of protection and 
other treaty provisions were drafted in the ASEAN regional investment 
treaties.  The vast uncertainty created by MFN clauses as to the scope of 
protection in the ASEAN regional investment treaties undermines the latter’s 
usefulness for creating a predictable rules-based environment for regional 
investment in Southeast Asia, especially under the aegis of the AEC and the 
Charter-based ASEAN institutions. 
 
Second, the ASEAN regional investment treaties’ definition of 
investment “in accordance with laws, regulations, and policies” of ASEAN 
Member States and/or their regional external partners (India, China, Korea, 
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) could create another opening for the 
applicability of intra-ASEAN BITs and individual BITs with ASEAN 
regional investment treaty external partners.  If these intra-ASEAN BITs and 
other individual BITs are deemed to be part of the “laws, regulations, and 
policies” of the ASEAN Member States, investors under the ASEAN regional 
investment treaties could be burdened with ensuring their investment 
complies with such BITs at the time of admission and/or establishment of such 
investment.  The uncertain scope of “laws, regulations, and policies” tacked 
on to the definition of investment in the ASEAN regional investment treaties 
introduces another layer of uncertainty to how foreign investors are expected 
to comply with the regulatory framework for the admission of their investment 
and proper coverage under the ASEAN regional investment treaties.  With no 
centralized exchanges or information made available to date between the 
ASEAN Member States in regard to their BITs, the foreign investor is left to 
assume the risk that its investment may be deemed in the future to have failed 
to comply with the “laws, regulations, and policies” of ASEAN Member 
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States, including in the form of intra-ASEAN BITs and individual BITs with 
ASEAN regional investment treaty partners. 
 
Finally, intra-ASEAN BITs and other individual BITs with ASEAN 
regional investment treaty external partners might also apply as part of the 
governing law of investor-state disputes under the ASEAN regional 
investment treaties, specifically for the ASEAN-China Investment Agreement 
and the ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter.  This expansion of the 
applicable law could affect an arbitral tribunal’s future interpretation of 
standards of investment protection, host-state defenses and exceptions, the 
scope of covered investment, transparency requirements, and any other 
obligations of host-states and home states of investment under the ASEAN 
regional investment treaties. 
 
C. Applicability of Domestic Law to Investment Treaty Standards in 
ASEAN Regional Investment Treaties 
 
To reiterate, many provisions and substantive standards of the ASEAN 
regional investment treaties routinely refer to the applicability of the ASEAN 
Member States’ domestic laws and regulations.  These “legality clauses”250 
infuse meaning into the scope of covered investments under an investment 
treaty (i.e., “investments made in accordance with investment law”), the 
definition of nationality of investors, the legality of juridical persons, the 
“public purpose” element in expropriation, general exceptions clauses, 
transparency rules, and procedural rules, among others, as seen throughout the 
ASEAN regional investment treaties.  Precisely because references to “laws,” 
“regulations,” and “policies” in the ASEAN regional investment treaties often 
do not qualitatively delineate between different material sources of law, an 
ASEAN Member State’s treaties and international agreements may also form 
part of its legal system251 and be included among the “domestic law” infusing 
substantive content into ASEAN regional investment treaty standards. 
 
If Southeast Asian BITs could be transmitted as part of the applicable 
domestic law for interpreting ASEAN regional investment treaties, there is a 
real danger that stricter obligations for host-states towards investors under the 
                                                          
250 See generally Rahim Moloo & Alex Khachaturian, The Compliance with the Law Requirement in 
International Investment Law, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1473 (2011). 
251 The Philippines, for example, does not strictly require legislative enactment for treaties incorporated 
into its legal system under the Incorporation Clause of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. CONST. (1987), art. 
II, § 2 (Phil.); see also Diane A. Desierto, A Universalist History of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (II), 11 
HISTORIA CONSTITUCIONAL 427, 475 (2010). 
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Southeast Asian BITs could influence the interpretation of host-state 
obligations under the ASEAN regional investment treaties, the RCEP draft 
investment chapter, and the CPTPP draft investment chapter.  On the other 
hand, the cross-fertilization of Southeast Asian BIT standards as part of the 
“domestic law” of an ASEAN Member State applying to ASEAN regional 
investment treaties could also introduce innovations in the latest generations 
of Southeast Asian investment treaty commitments. 252   In any case, it is 
crucial to examine how international law (specifically treaty law) is 
incorporated into each of the ten ASEAN Member States’ respective legal 
systems253 to ascertain the full extent to which international law could form 
part of the corpus of “domestic law” applying to many critical ASEAN 
regional investment treaty standards.  The scope of such domestic law is vast, 
given the diversity of legal systems among the ASEAN Member States, where 
one finds “civil law systems, common law systems, a mixture of both systems, 
and other legal traditions like Islamic law.”254 
 
The domestic laws of the ASEAN Member States have a role as 
governing law for investor-state disputes covered by the ICSID Convention.  
Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention mandates the investor-state arbitral 
tribunal “decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be 
agreed upon by the parties.  In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal 
shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute . . . and such 
rules of international law as may be applicable.”255  Because of this provision, 
both international and domestic law would apply in parallel sources of 
governing law in the absence of any stipulation by the disputing parties.256 
 
The explanation of the annulment committee in Wena Hotels v. Egypt 
as to the role of the second sentence of Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention 
is instructive.  In that case, the Wena Hotels annulment committee 
                                                          
252 See, e.g., Draft EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 68, ch. 9. 
253 Forthcoming country monographs in the ASEAN Integration Through Law series will discuss these 
precise issues for each of the ten ASEAN Member States. For more information on this series, see Academic: 
Integration Through Law, CAMBRIDGE U. PRESS, http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/ 
integration-through-law (last visited Feb. 25, 2018). 
254 MOHAMMAD F.A. NSOUR, RETHINKING THE WORLD TRADE ORDER: TOWARDS A BETTER LEGAL 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROLE OF REGIONALISM IN THE MULTILATERAL TRADE REGIME 296 (2009). 
255 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 
art. 42, ¶ 1, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966). 
256 See CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 618–21 (2d ed. 
2009); Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi, The Meaning of ‘and’ in Article 42(1), Second Sentence of the 
Washington Convention: The Role of International Law in the ICSID Choice of Law Process, 18 ICSID REV. 
375 (2003). 
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acknowledged that while there was scholarly and jurisprudential divergence 
as to the actual scope of international law to be applied vis-à-vis the host-
state’s domestic law to investor-state disputes under the ICSID Convention, 
in any event: 
 
[W]hat is clear is that the sense and meaning of the negotiations 
leading to the second sentence of Article 42(1) allowed for both 
legal orders to have a role.  The law of the host State can indeed 
be applied in conjunction with international law if this is 
justified.  So too international law can be applied by itself if the 
appropriate rule is found in this other ambit.257 
 
Thus, where an ASEAN Member State can show that its other BITs 
(particularly those that overlap with ASEAN regional investment treaty 
partners) are monistically integrated into its domestic law—meaning that it 
would automatically apply as domestic law without need of subsequent 
legislative enactment or transformation of the treaty into statute—potential 
disparities could also arise between the regional investment treaty standard 
and the body of domestic law applied by the ASEAN Member State. 
 
D. Risk of Parallel Proceedings for Investor-State Claims Arising 
from Breach of an ASEAN Regional Investment Treaty, 
Individual Southeast Asian BIT, or FTA Investment Chapter 
 
Given the linguistic variability between the ASEAN regional 
investment treaties and the universe of over 600 Southeast Asian BITs and 
FTA investment chapters, it is foreseeable that causes of action for separate 
investor-state claims could be framed for breaches of standards in the ASEAN 
regional investment treaties as well as Southeast Asian BITs, even if the 
causes of action could fundamentally involve the same investment project.  
Parallel multiple proceedings in investor-state treaty arbitration as a result of 
the proliferation of investment treaties (regional and bilateral) cannot be 
addressed without treaty coordination mechanisms in place to control for 
preclusive effects, such as lis pendens, res judicata, forum non conveniens, 
anti-suit injunctions, and consolidations, among others. 258   None of the 
                                                          
257 Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Decision on the 
Application for Annulment, ¶ 40 (Jan. 28, 2002), 41 ILM 933 (2002). 
258 See, e.g., Katia Yannaca-Small, Parallel Proceedings, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 174, at 1008. 
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ASEAN regional investment treaties provide for any stay of further 
proceedings involving the same investment project or transaction. 
 
Moreover, the ASEAN Member States should be aware that the 
definition of “investment” in the ASEAN regional investment treaties 
including shareholdings 259  might also include minority shareholders.  In 
Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Republic, the arbitral 
tribunal affirmed that insofar as foreign shareholders of local companies are 
concerned, “[w]hatever the extent of [their] investment may have been, [they 
were] entitled to invoke the BIT in respect of conduct alleged to constitute a 
breach.”260  Likewise in Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic,261 the arbitral 
tribunal found that where the investment treaty specifies shares as part of its 
definition of investment and makes no distinction between majority and 
minority shareholdings, such “[t]reaty language and intent is specific in 
extending this protection to minority or indirect shareholders.” 262   The 
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction in CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. 
Argentina also affirmed that, where investment treaties do not distinguish 
between majority and minority shareholders, the treaties do not deprive 
minority shareholders of their rights as covered investors.263 
 
Given the simultaneous applicability of an ASEAN regional investment 
treaty and an individual BIT of an ASEAN Member State, there is a 
substantial risk of parallel proceedings arising from different treaty-based 
causes of action, as well as the possibility of claims lodged by minority 
shareholders.  ASEAN Member States should be concerned with this prospect 
of multiplicity of investor-state disputes arising from essentially the same 
investment project or investment transaction. 
 
                                                          
259 ACIA, supra note 21, art. 4, ¶ 1(c)(ii); ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24, art. 1, 
¶ 1(j)(ii); ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, art. 1, ¶ 1(d)(ii); ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA 
Investment Chapter, supra note 22, art. 2, ¶ 1(c)(ii); ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note 25, 
art. 2, ¶ 1(e)(i). 
260 Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, 
Decision on Annulment, ¶ 50 (July 3, 2002), 41 I.L.M. 1135 (2002). 
261 Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Jurisdiction (Ancillary 
Claim), ¶¶ 29–39 (Aug. 2, 2004), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ 
ita0291.pdf. 
262 Id. ¶ 29. 
263 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Objections to 
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 63–65 (July 17, 2003), 42 I.L.M. 788 (2003); see also Lanco Int’l Inc. v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/6, Preliminary Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 14–15 (Dec. 8, 1998), 40 I.L.M. 457 
(2001); LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Objections to Jurisdiction, 
¶ 50 (Apr. 30 2004), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0458.pdf. 
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E. Different Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in 
ASEAN 
 
There is no single global “fork in the road” clause that applies to all the 
ASEAN regional investment treaties, the RCEP draft investment chapter, the 
CPTPP draft investment chapter, and ASEAN Member States’ pre-existing 
and future individual BITs and FTA investment chapters that could bind an 
investor claimant to an exclusive choice of remedy.  Investors can choose a 
combination of remedies from a full spectrum of court adjudication, 
administrative tribunals, consultations, negotiations, conciliation procedures, 
and investor-state arbitration. 264  Within this vast universe of forums, the 
hierarchy, preference, and connection between these specialized treaty-based 
dispute settlement mechanisms with existing dispute settlement mechanisms 
under the ASEAN Charter-based system has not yet been studied.  The 2004 
ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism, for example, 
states that its rules and procedures “shall apply to disputes brought pursuant 
to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the Agreement as well 
as the agreements listed in Appendix I and future ASEAN economic 
agreements (the ‘covered agreements’).”265  This provision could be a basis 
to invoke the dispute settlement system in the ASEAN Protocol, which 
appears more structurally analogous to the WTO’s dispute settlement 
processes through assembled Panels with appeals brought to a standing 
Appellate Body.266  It should be stressed here that Article 24 of the ASEAN 
Charter states that “[w]here not otherwise specifically provided, disputes 
which concern the interpretation or application of ASEAN economic 
agreements shall be settled in accordance with the ASEAN Protocol on 
Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism.”267  Further analysis, not just of 
treaty texts but also of the corresponding travaux preparatoires, is necessary 
to examine the dispute settlement and procedural implications from all of the 
language of the ASEAN regional investment treaties, the RCEP draft 
investment chapter, the CPTPP draft investment chapter, the over 600 
ASEAN Member States’ respective individual BITs and FTA investment 
chapters, the ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism, 
and the ASEAN Charter. 
                                                          
264 See ACIA, supra note 21, arts. 28–41; ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note 25, art. 20; 
ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, arts. 18–28; ASEAN-Korea Investment 
Agreement, supra note 24, art. 18; ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, at arts. 13–15. 
265 ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism, supra note 74, art. 1, ¶ 1 (emphasis 
added). 
266 Id. arts. 5–16. 
267 ASEAN Charter art. 24. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
The ASEAN regional investment treaties, the RCEP draft investment 
chapter, and the CPTPP draft investment chapter contain various mechanisms 
for host-states to retain regulatory discretion, policy space, and to narrow the 
scope of possible disputes with investors.  On the one hand, the more 
concerted drafting efforts demonstrate the region’s preference to “rebalance” 
commitments to investors with states’ individual and regional interests.  On 
the other hand, however, because ASEAN Member States have not given any 
formal precedence to these treaties, they continue to exist amid much older 
preexisting generations of BITs for each ASEAN Member State.  These BITs 
do not contain as many public policy innovations as the ASEAN regional 
investment treaties (and the RCEP draft) attempt.  Consequently, investors 
have not brought claims under these treaties, and instead pursue recourse 
under the more liberal provisions of the older BIT regimes that emphasize 
investment protection and reserve little prerogatives for host-states to defend 
their regulatory measures.  Unless ASEAN (and parties to RCEP) purposely 
create mechanisms to govern the interaction of preexisting BITs with the 
stricter standards in the regional investment treaties, it will likely be a long 
time before these treaties are invoked in investor-state disputes. 
 
The AEC Blueprint 2025 set out the vision to “[c]reate a deeply 
integrated and highly cohesive ASEAN economy” by “[p]romot[ing] the 
principles of good governance, transparency, and responsive regulatory 
regimes” through various stakeholders, and “[w]ork[ing] towards a common 
position . . . in global economic fora.”268  ASEAN Member States already 
recognize the need for “effective, efficient, coherent, and responsive 
regulations, and good regulatory practices.”269 
 
Regional economic integration necessitates policy and 
regulatory changes and refinements in most, if not all, ASEAN 
Member States, taking into consideration their different levels of 
development . . . .  ASEAN Member States need to ensure that 
the regulatory regime is relevant, robust, effective, coherent, 
transparent, accountable, and forward looking in terms of 
regulatory structures and design, as well as implementation 
processes. 270 
                                                          
268 AEC Blueprint 2025, supra note 3, ¶ 6(x). 
269 Id. § B.7. 
270 Id. ¶ 38. 
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Strategic measures identified in the AEC Blueprint 2025 to achieve these 
goals include enacting regulations that are “pro-competitive, commensurate 
with objectives, and non-discriminatory,” while undertaking regular “review 
of existing regulatory implementation processes and procedures for further 
streamlining.”271 
 
This regional concern for regulatory quality, predictability, coherence, 
and transparency should also extend now to ASEAN’s investment treaty 
commitments.  With the continued robust growth of foreign investment in 
Southeast Asia under ASEAN economic integration, measures for legal 
harmonization and regional institutional coordination are increasingly 
necessary.  The ASEAN Investment Area Coordinating Council, the ASEAN 
CCI, and all the ad hoc ASEAN bodies created under the ASEAN regional 
investment treaties must ensure regularly coordinated exchanges of 
information within a more formalized framework under the umbrella of the 
AEC.  These information exchanges should centralize the pre-existing and 
future investment treaty commitments of each ASEAN Member State with 
those assumed by ASEAN at the regional level through the ASEAN regional 
investment treaties, as well as with those to be anticipated from mega-regional 
investment treaties such as the RCEP draft investment chapter and the CPTPP 
draft investment chapter.  Ongoing monitoring of the formulation of standards 
on the coverage of these treaties (including areas for entry of other investment 
treaty norms) should be transparently reported to the ASEAN Member States 
before they sign any future ASEAN regional investment agreements.  The 
impacts of diversified investment treaty protection standards, host-state 
defenses of their regulatory and public policy spaces, and avenues for 
participation of the widest possible stakeholders in foreign investment 
(especially including local communities directly affected by the operations of 
foreign investment) must be routinely examined, assessed, and reported by the 
AEC to the ASEAN Summit.  It is only by properly implementing the 
objectives of legal harmonization and coordination in the realm of ASEAN 
(and ASEAN Member States’) investment treaty commitments that ASEAN 
will realize its vision of a cohesive, consistent, and predictable Southeast Asia 
investment policy driving the growth of balanced and sustainable Southeast 
Asia investment. 
 
                                                          
271 Id. ¶ 39(i), (ii). 
